registry / create-zuplo-api / 7.11.9
create-zuplo-api@7.11.9
Create Zuplo API with one command
AI Security Review
scanned 20d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe agent setup is user-selected and project-scoped, but it configures agent extensions and capabilities, matching the warning category for first-party agent extension setup. No concrete malicious behavior or unconsented install-hook mutation was identified.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A user selects agents at the interactive prompt or supplies the explicit agents option.
Impact
Configured agents may later use the enabled extensions, MCP server, and skills; the inspected source does not establish harmful execution or credential disclosure.
Mechanism
The CLI writes project-level agent settings and instructions; Claude settings enable Zuplo plugins and project MCP servers, while other selected agents receive downloaded skills.
AI rationale
The agent setup is user-selected and project-scoped, but it configures agent extensions and capabilities, matching the warning category for first-party agent extension setup. No concrete malicious behavior or unconsented install-hook mutation was identified.
Evidence
dist/index.js.mcp.json.claude/settings.jsonCLAUDE.md.agents/skills.claude/skills
Network endpoints2
codeload.github.com/zuplo/tools/tar.gz/maindev.zuplo.com/mcp/docs
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 87.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- package.json exposes a command-line entrypoint and declares no install lifecycle hook.
- dist/index.js maps selected agents to project configuration locations and fetches skills from Zuplo's tools repository.
- Claude setup enables Zuplo plugins, trusts its GitHub marketplace, and enables project MCP servers.
- Agent configuration and skills are written only when the project creator has selected agents.
- The CLI asks which agents to configure; noninteractive mode defaults to no agents, and an explicit agents option is available.
Evidence against
- The setup is project-scoped and requires agent selection; it does not run from an npm install hook.
- The configured plugin marketplace, skills source, and documentation MCP server are Zuplo-aligned.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsMinified
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
1#!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: missingProperty: ${g},
L7: depsCount: ${u},
L8: deps: ${
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L11Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: m
Findings
2 Critical6 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighEvaldist/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
Low
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to create-zuplo-api@7.11.9.
See all versions of create-zuplo-api for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of create-zuplo-api@7.11.9 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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