registry / create-zuplo-api / 7.12.1
create-zuplo-api@7.12.1
Create Zuplo API with one command
AI Security Review
scanned 20d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no install lifecycle hook or confirmed attack behavior. Agent configuration is optional and selection-driven, while analytics sends usage metadata to a package-aligned endpoint and can be disabled with ZUPLO_DO_NOT_TRACK.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
The user runs the CLI and selects one or more agents, or supplies them through its options.
Impact
The inspected behavior supports project setup and limited usage analytics; it does not establish credential theft or another attack.
Mechanism
The CLI writes selected agent configuration into the new project and can download Zuplo skills; it also sends an opt-out-gated usage event to package-aligned analytics.
AI rationale
Source inspection found no install lifecycle hook or confirmed attack behavior. Agent configuration is optional and selection-driven, while analytics sends usage metadata to a package-aligned endpoint and can be disabled with ZUPLO_DO_NOT_TRACK.
Evidence
package.jsondist/index.js
Network endpoints2
codeload.github.com/zuplo/tools/tar.gz/mainapp.posthog.com/capture/
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 94.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The manifest exposes dist/index.js as the CLI and declares build and test scripts, with no install lifecycle hook.
- Agent setup is optional: the CLI asks which agents to configure, and writes configuration only when the selection is nonempty. The files target the new project, and optional skills come from Zuplo’s tools repository.
- The CLI sends an opt-out-gated creation event with version and selected options; its package-manager metadata is limited to package-manager, runner, install-source, Node, platform, and architecture fields.
Evidence against
- The CLI downloads agent skills and writes agent configuration files, but this occurs as part of project creation after agent selection.
- The bundle uses network and environment APIs for package-aligned setup and usage analytics; inspected code does not show credential collection or disclosure.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
1#!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: missingProperty: ${g},
L7: depsCount: ${u},
L8: deps: ${
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L11Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: m
Findings
2 Critical6 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighEvaldist/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
Low
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to create-zuplo-api@7.12.1.
See all versions of create-zuplo-api for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of create-zuplo-api@7.12.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.