create-zuplo-api@7.7.7
Create Zuplo API with one command
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has no automatic npm lifecycle trigger or confirmed credential theft. Its explicit agent setup writes AI-agent control files and fetches remote skills, which is a real but user-invoked capability risk under the stated policy.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A user runs create-zuplo-api and selects agents or supplies --agents.
Impact
A selected destination project can receive MCP and agent instruction files plus remotely fetched skills; this extends an AI coding agent's project context.
Mechanism
User-directed AI-agent configuration, remote skill download, and telemetry submission.
AI rationale
The package has no automatic npm lifecycle trigger or confirmed credential theft. Its explicit agent setup writes AI-agent control files and fetches remote skills, which is a real but user-invoked capability risk under the stated policy.
Evidence
dist/index.js.mcp.json.claude/settings.jsonCLAUDE.md.github/copilot-instructions.md.cursorrules.windsurfrulesAGENTS.md.agents/skills/*/SKILL.md
Network endpoints3
codeload.github.comdev.zuplo.comapp.posthog.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 86.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The user-invoked CLI can write MCP and AI-agent instruction files into the newly created project.
- When AI agents are selected, it downloads skills from a GitHub tarball and installs them into agent-specific project folders.
- The CLI sends invocation telemetry to PostHog unless the user sets its opt-out environment variable.
- It can run the selected package manager to install dependencies in the new project.
Evidence against
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
- The agent configuration is selected through the CLI's --agents option or interactive prompt, rather than during package installation.
- The telemetry payload contains generated and package-manager usage data, not harvested environment values or files.
- The child-process use is for normal project dependency installation and optional Git initialization.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
1#!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: missingProperty: ${g},
L7: depsCount: ${u},
L8: deps: ${
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L11Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: m
Findings
2 Critical6 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighEvaldist/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
Low
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to create-zuplo-api@7.7.7.
See all versions of create-zuplo-api for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of create-zuplo-api@7.7.7 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.