registry / create-zuplo-api / 7.8.16
create-zuplo-api@7.8.16
Create Zuplo API with one command
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiAgent setup is a first-party, opt-in CLI feature rather than an install hook, but it still registers a Claude plugin marketplace and copies skill files from an unpinned GitHub branch into agent control files. That guarded extension setup is worth a warning and is not a publish block.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A person runs create-zuplo-api and selects one or more agents in the prompt or passes --agents.
Impact
The new project trusts Zuplo docs MCP and, for Claude, a GitHub plugin marketplace that can supply later skill content. No install-time or hidden mutation of the user environment was found.
Mechanism
installAgentConfigs writes .mcp.json and agent instruction or Claude settings files, and installSkills extracts SKILL.md files from the GitHub tarball into the selected agent skill directories.
AI rationale
Agent setup is a first-party, opt-in CLI feature rather than an install hook, but it still registers a Claude plugin marketplace and copies skill files from an unpinned GitHub branch into agent control files. That guarded extension setup is worth a warning and is not a publish block.
Evidence
dist/index.js.mcp.json.claude/settings.jsonCLAUDE.md.claude/skillsAGENTS.md.github/copilot-instructions.md.cursorrules.windsurfrules.agents/skills.cursor/skills.windsurf/skills
Network endpoints2
codeload.github.com/zuplo/tools/tar.gz/maindev.zuplo.com/mcp/docs
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 78.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The published entry is a user-run bin, create-zuplo-api to dist/index.js, and package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- Agent files are written only after an interactive multiselect or an explicit --agents value; selecting none clears the list.
- installAgentConfigs writes .mcp.json and, for Claude, .claude/settings.json that enables zuplo/tools plugins, registers that GitHub marketplace, and sets enableAllProjectMcpServers.
- Non-Claude selections download SKILL.md files from the unpinned https://codeload.github.com/zuplo/tools/tar.gz/main tarball into the chosen agent skill directories.
- The generated MCP config points at the first-party docs endpoint https://dev.zuplo.com/mcp/docs.
Evidence against
- Nothing runs at npm install time; CI or skip-prompts leaves the agent list empty.
- The MCP host is the Zuplo docs service, not an unrelated recipient.
- A PostHog capture on CLI invoke sends scaffold choices and a random id, and is skipped when ZUPLO_DO_NOT_TRACK is set; it does not read service credentials.
Behavioral surface
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
1#!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: missingProperty: ${g},
L7: depsCount: ${u},
L8: deps: ${
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L11Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: m
Findings
2 Critical6 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighEvaldist/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
Low
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to create-zuplo-api@7.8.16.
See all versions of create-zuplo-api for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of create-zuplo-api@7.8.16 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.