create-zuplo-api@7.8.22
Create Zuplo API with one command
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiInspected source supports a warning for conditional credential forwarding and guarded agent configuration. Explicit CLI activation, package-aligned defaults, and absent install hooks do not support a malicious verdict.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Run project creation with server-project setup enabled and an overridden API endpoint, or explicitly select agent configuration.
Impact
Conditional credential exposure and guarded changes to agent capabilities warrant a warning, without evidence supporting publication blocking.
Mechanism
The CLI reads saved authentication and sends bearer-authenticated requests to the configured endpoint. Agent setup writes instructions and enables a GitHub marketplace without pinning a release; later plugin update behavior belongs to the agent platform.
AI rationale
Inspected source supports a warning for conditional credential forwarding and guarded agent configuration. Explicit CLI activation, package-aligned defaults, and absent install hooks do not support a malicious verdict.
Evidence
dist/index.js.mcp.json.claude/settings.jsonCLAUDE.mdAGENTS.md.github/copilot-instructions.md.cursorrules.windsurfrules
Network endpoints3
dev.zuplo.comdev.zuplo.com/mcp/docscodeload.github.com/zuplo/tools/tar.gz/main
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 96.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The package exposes dist/index.js as its CLI and declares no install lifecycle hooks or runtime self-dependency.
- Selected agent setup writes project-local instructions, MCP configuration, and Claude settings enabling Zuplo marketplace plugins and all project MCP servers.
- Agent selection requires a CLI flag or interactive selection; non-interactive execution defaults to no agents, and agent choices are not saved.
- Server-project setup reads an existing Zuplo access token from its authentication file.
- ZUPLO_DEVELOPER_API_ENDPOINT selects the API destination without an enforced destination restriction.
- The active server-project setup forwards the stored token as bearer authentication when fetching accounts.
Evidence against
- The default authentication destination is the package-aligned https://dev.zuplo.com.
- Agent configuration occurs during explicit project creation, with no npm install hook mutation.
- No concrete covert exfiltration or malware intent was established.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcess
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
1#!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: missingProperty: ${g},
L7: depsCount: ${u},
L8: deps: ${
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L11Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: m
Findings
2 Critical6 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighEvaldist/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
Low
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to create-zuplo-api@7.8.22.
See all versions of create-zuplo-api for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of create-zuplo-api@7.8.22 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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