create-zuplo-api@7.8.23
Create Zuplo API with one command
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource establishes conditional credential forwarding to an unrestricted configured destination and guarded agent configuration capabilities, warranting a warning. No concrete malware behavior or block-eligible install hook was identified.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Run the CLI with server-project setup enabled and ZUPLO_DEVELOPER_API_ENDPOINT overridden, or select agents during project creation.
Impact
An overridden endpoint can receive a service credential intended for Zuplo. Selected agent configuration enables remote plugin and MCP capabilities within the project.
Mechanism
The CLI reads the stored access token and sends bearer authentication to the selected API endpoint. Agent selection writes project instructions and plugin settings; Claude's enabled marketplace plugins delegate subsequent installation and updates to the agent platform.
AI rationale
Source establishes conditional credential forwarding to an unrestricted configured destination and guarded agent configuration capabilities, warranting a warning. No concrete malware behavior or block-eligible install hook was identified.
Evidence
dist/index.jsauth.json.mcp.json.claude/settings.jsonCLAUDE.mdAGENTS.md.github/copilot-instructions.md.cursorrules.windsurfrules
Network endpoints3
dev.zuplo.comdev.zuplo.com/mcp/docscodeload.github.com/zuplo/tools/tar.gz/main
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 97.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- package.json identifies dist/index.js as the CLI and has no install lifecycle hooks or runtime self-dependency.
- Optional server-project setup reads the existing Zuplo access token from the user's auth.json file.
- ZUPLO_DEVELOPER_API_ENDPOINT overrides the API destination without a destination allowlist; account requests send the existing token as bearer authentication.
- The active CLI calls token discovery through server-project creation and linking.
- Agent setup is gated by explicit agent selection; noninteractive execution defaults to no agents.
- Selected agent setup writes project configuration and enables Zuplo Claude plugins, their GitHub marketplace, and all project MCP servers.
Evidence against
- The default authenticated destination is https://dev.zuplo.com, aligned with Zuplo.
- Server-project creation has a prompt or explicit CLI flags; no covert install-time execution was identified.
- Agent configuration is scoped to the generated project; no broad home-directory agent mutation was found.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcess
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
1#!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: missingProperty: ${g},
L7: depsCount: ${u},
L8: deps: ${
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L11Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: m
Findings
2 Critical6 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighEvaldist/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
Low
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to create-zuplo-api@7.8.23.
See all versions of create-zuplo-api for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of create-zuplo-api@7.8.23 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.