create-zuplo-api@7.8.25
Create Zuplo API with one command
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe unrestricted endpoint override can forward existing service credentials, which meets the conditional credential-exposure warning rule. Agent integration is user-selected rather than an unconsented npm install hook, so publication blocking is unsupported.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Run the CLI with server-project setup enabled and ZUPLO_DEVELOPER_API_ENDPOINT overridden; agent changes require selecting agents.
Impact
Conditional exposure of a Zuplo session credential to another endpoint, plus consent-gated agent extension activation.
Mechanism
The CLI reads saved Zuplo authentication and attaches it to requests without restricting the endpoint. Agent selection writes local configuration enabling Zuplo plugins and MCP access.
AI rationale
The unrestricted endpoint override can forward existing service credentials, which meets the conditional credential-exposure warning rule. Agent integration is user-selected rather than an unconsented npm install hook, so publication blocking is unsupported.
Evidence
dist/index.js.mcp.json.claude/settings.jsonCLAUDE.mdAGENTS.md.github/copilot-instructions.md.cursorrules.windsurfrules
Network endpoints3
dev.zuplo.comdev.zuplo.com/mcp/docscodeload.github.com/zuplo/tools/tar.gz/main
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 96.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- package.json routes the CLI to dist/index.js and defines no registry install lifecycle hooks.
- The developer API endpoint accepts ZUPLO_DEVELOPER_API_ENDPOINT without destination validation.
- The CLI reads an existing access token from the Zuplo auth.json file and sends it as a bearer credential to the selected endpoint.
- Server-project setup calls the token reader and account request after activation through the CLI flag or interactive prompt.
- Agent setup requires CLI selection and writes project-local instructions and MCP settings; noninteractive defaults select no agents.
- Claude setup enables Zuplo marketplace plugins and all project MCP servers, creating a guarded extension capability.
Evidence against
- The default credential recipient is https://dev.zuplo.com, aligned with Zuplo authentication.
- No covert credential export or malicious install-time mutation was identified; server-project and agent setup are user-invoked.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVars
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
1#!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: missingProperty: ${g},
L7: depsCount: ${u},
L8: deps: ${
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L11Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: m
Findings
2 Critical6 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighEvaldist/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
Low
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to create-zuplo-api@7.8.25.
See all versions of create-zuplo-api for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of create-zuplo-api@7.8.25 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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