registry / create-zuplo-api / 7.9.14
create-zuplo-api@7.9.14
Create Zuplo API with one command
AI Security Review
scanned 29d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe agent integration is a concrete, first-party project setup capability activated by explicit CLI selection, so it merits a warning under the agent integration policy. The inspected source does not establish credential exfiltration or unconsented install-time mutation.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Running the project-creation CLI with one or more agents selected through --agents.
Impact
Selected agents can use Zuplo documentation and skills within the generated project; no credential collection or unrelated recipient was identified.
Mechanism
The CLI writes selected agents' guidance and MCP files, enables Zuplo marketplace plugins in Claude settings, and downloads Zuplo skill files.
AI rationale
The agent integration is a concrete, first-party project setup capability activated by explicit CLI selection, so it merits a warning under the agent integration policy. The inspected source does not establish credential exfiltration or unconsented install-time mutation.
Evidence
dist/index.js.mcp.jsonCLAUDE.md.claude/settings.jsonAGENTS.md
Network endpoints2
dev.zuplo.com/mcp/docscodeload.github.com/zuplo/tools/tar.gz/main
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 83.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The package exposes a project-creation CLI and has no npm install lifecycle hook.
- Agent setup is activated by the explicit --agents option, and only when the selected list is nonempty.
- Selected agents receive project-level configuration; Claude setup writes settings and guidance files.
- Claude settings enable Zuplo marketplace plugins and project MCP servers, while other selected agents receive Zuplo documentation MCP configuration.
- Skills are downloaded from Zuplo's tools archive and copied into selected agents' project skill directories.
Evidence against
- The source shows agent configuration as part of explicit project creation, not npm install or import; the endpoints and files are Zuplo-aligned.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscation
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
1#!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: missingProperty: ${g},
L7: depsCount: ${u},
L8: deps: ${
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L11Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: m
Findings
2 Critical6 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighEvaldist/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
Low
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to create-zuplo-api@7.9.14.
See all versions of create-zuplo-api for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of create-zuplo-api@7.9.14 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.