registry / create-zuplo-api / 7.9.19
create-zuplo-api@7.9.19
Create Zuplo API with one command
AI Security Review
scanned 25d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no install lifecycle hook or concrete attack behavior. Agent setup is selected in the CLI, while telemetry uses an analytics identifier and package-manager properties; the scanner’s credential and execution flags do not establish an attack.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Running the CLI; agent configuration requires an interactive selection, with no agents selected by default in CI or --yes mode.
Impact
No credential theft or unconsented agent control-surface mutation was established.
Mechanism
The CLI writes selected agent configuration into the generated project and sends limited usage analytics to PostHog.
AI rationale
Source inspection found no install lifecycle hook or concrete attack behavior. Agent setup is selected in the CLI, while telemetry uses an analytics identifier and package-manager properties; the scanner’s credential and execution flags do not establish an attack.
Evidence
package.jsondist/index.js
Network endpoints2
app.posthog.comcodeload.github.com/zuplo/tools/tar.gz/main
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 92.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json exposes a CLI at dist/index.js and lists no install lifecycle hook.
- dist/index.js contains agent configuration paths for files including AGENTS.md and .mcp.json.
- The CLI asks interactively which AI coding agents to configure; CI or --yes mode selects none by default.
- Agent setup writes project configuration and skill files; the inspected code does not establish a malicious control-surface mutation.
- Telemetry sends a generated or stored analytics ID and package-manager usage properties to PostHog, not discovered environment credentials.
Evidence against
- The CLI performs network requests and uses child processes for ordinary project creation and repository setup.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
1#!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: missingProperty: ${g},
L7: depsCount: ${u},
L8: deps: ${
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L11Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: m
Findings
2 Critical6 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighEvaldist/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
Low
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to create-zuplo-api@7.9.19.
See all versions of create-zuplo-api for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of create-zuplo-api@7.9.19 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.