create-zuplo-api@7.9.5
Create Zuplo API with one command
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource supports a warning for conditional credential exposure and guarded agent configuration capability, rather than the scanner's malicious classification. No concrete attack behavior warrants publication blocking.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Run the CLI with server-project setup enabled and an overridden developer API endpoint, or select agent configuration.
Impact
Conditional exposure of the existing service token and activation of selected agent capabilities.
Mechanism
Saved authentication is forwarded to an unrestricted environment-selected endpoint. Agent selection writes project configuration and enables Zuplo plugins; no automatic update loop was found in the inspected setup code.
AI rationale
Source supports a warning for conditional credential exposure and guarded agent configuration capability, rather than the scanner's malicious classification. No concrete attack behavior warrants publication blocking.
Evidence
dist/index.js.mcp.json.claude/settings.jsonCLAUDE.mdAGENTS.md.github/copilot-instructions.md.cursorrules.windsurfrules
Network endpoints3
dev.zuplo.comdev.zuplo.com/mcp/docscodeload.github.com/zuplo/tools/tar.gz/main
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 97.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The manifest has no npm install lifecycle hooks; setup runs through the CLI.
- The developer API endpoint accepts ZUPLO_DEVELOPER_API_ENDPOINT without a destination allowlist.
- The CLI reads an existing Zuplo access token and sends it as bearer authentication to the selected endpoint.
- Server-project setup calls the saved-token account lookup when no account is selected.
- Agent selection is prompted or supplied explicitly; noninteractive mode defaults to no agents.
- Selected agent setup writes project instructions and MCP configuration and enables Zuplo Claude plugins through a GitHub marketplace.
Evidence against
- The default authenticated destination is https://dev.zuplo.com, consistent with Zuplo project setup.
- No concrete covert exfiltration or malicious install behavior was established.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
1#!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: missingProperty: ${g},
L7: depsCount: ${u},
L8: deps: ${
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L11Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: m
Findings
2 Critical6 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighEvaldist/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
Low
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to create-zuplo-api@7.9.5.
See all versions of create-zuplo-api for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of create-zuplo-api@7.9.5 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.