create-zuplo-api@7.9.6
Create Zuplo API with one command
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiStatic inspection establishes conditional credential exposure and explicit agent configuration capabilities, warranting a warning. The source does not support the scanner's malicious-package block.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Run the CLI with server-project setup enabled and ZUPLO_DEVELOPER_API_ENDPOINT overridden; agent configuration activates through a selection or flag.
Impact
Conditional disclosure of the saved service token and activation of selected agent capabilities, rather than proven covert theft or install-hook abuse.
Mechanism
The CLI reads saved authentication and sends bearer-authenticated requests to the overridden endpoint without an allowlist. Agent selection writes local configuration enabling Zuplo plugins, without a separate update-consent gate shown.
AI rationale
Static inspection establishes conditional credential exposure and explicit agent configuration capabilities, warranting a warning. The source does not support the scanner's malicious-package block.
Evidence
dist/index.js.local/state/zuplo/auth.json.mcp.json.claude/settings.jsonCLAUDE.mdAGENTS.md
Network endpoints3
dev.zuplo.comdev.zuplo.com/mcp/docscodeload.github.com/zuplo/tools/tar.gz/main
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 96.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The manifest has no npm install lifecycle hooks or runtime self-dependency.
- The CLI locates an existing Zuplo authentication file and reads its access token.
- The developer API endpoint accepts an environment override without destination restrictions; account requests send the saved token as bearer authentication.
- Server-project setup activates token-backed requests through the explicit CLI setup flow.
- Selected agent setup writes project-local instructions, skills and MCP configuration; Claude settings enable Zuplo plugins and all project MCP servers.
- Agent configuration requires a CLI selection or flag; noninteractive execution defaults to no agents.
Evidence against
- The default credential recipient is the intended Zuplo service.
- No covert credential export or malicious install-time behavior was established.
- Project creation, dependency installation and Git initialization match the scaffolding command's purpose.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVars
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
1#!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: missingProperty: ${g},
L7: depsCount: ${u},
L8: deps: ${
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L11Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: m
Findings
2 Critical6 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighEvaldist/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
Low
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to create-zuplo-api@7.9.6.
See all versions of create-zuplo-api for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of create-zuplo-api@7.9.6 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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