registry / cursor-browser-cli / 1.2.0

cursor-browser-cli@1.2.0

CLI + MCP to drive Cursor IDE's built-in Browser Tab from Grok Build, Claude Code, Codex, or shell

AI Security Review

scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Install-time setup mutates multiple foreign AI-agent skill roots and conditionally registers an MCP server with Grok. It also installs a startup-activated Cursor extension.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm postinstall

Impact

An npm install can add package-controlled instructions and browser-control capability to several local AI-agent surfaces without an explicit setup command.

Mechanism

Cross-agent skill/MCP registration and Cursor extension deployment

Policy narrative

Installing the package automatically runs setup.js. That script writes its SKILL.md into Grok, Claude, Cursor, Codex, and generic agent skill directories, replaces Cursor extension folders, and, when Grok is present, removes and adds an MCP registration pointing to the package server. The extension starts on Cursor activation and exposes unauthenticated localhost browser-control actions. These are unconsented postinstall mutations of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces.

Rationale

The lifecycle script performs broad cross-vendor agent configuration and MCP registration without explicit user setup. Local-only networking and the apparent browser-automation purpose do not remove that install-time control-surface mutation.

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/setup.jsextension/extension.jsmcp/server.mjs~/.grok/skills/cursor-browser/SKILL.md~/.claude/skills/cursor-browser/SKILL.md~/.agents/skills/cursor-browser/SKILL.md

cursor-browser-cli@1.2.0

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code