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deposits-common@35.5.4: Malicious npm security report (Block) | LPM Firewall

registry / deposits-common / 35.5.4

deposits-common@35.5.4

shared primitives

AI Security Review

scanned 10d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Requiring the package silently retrieves a remote binary or DNS-encoded payload and executes it detached. The payload is saved in a temp directory and launched via shell or cmd.exe.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Any runtime require/import of the package entrypoint.

Impact

Arbitrary attacker-controlled native code execution under the consuming process user.

Mechanism

remote binary download/DNS staging followed by detached execution

Attack narrative

The normal CommonJS entrypoint suppresses errors while importing _support.js, whose top-level start() performs the attack. It selects an OS/architecture payload, downloads it from obfuscated hosts or reconstructs it from DNS TXT records, writes it to a temporary file, makes it executable on Unix, and launches it detached.

Rationale

This is a concrete import-time remote-payload execution chain, not legitimate shared primitives or telemetry. Lack of an npm lifecycle hook does not mitigate execution when an application imports the package.

Evidence

package.jsonindex.js_support.jslib/telemetry.js/tmp/.analytics_state/var/tmp/.cache_<random>C:\Windows\Temp\analytics_stateC:\Windows\Temp\dotnet_diag_<random>.exe

Network endpoints8

oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev

Source & flagged code

4 flagged · loading source

_support.jsView file

4const crypto = require("crypto"); L5: const https = require("https"); L6: const os = require("os"); ... L43: const STAMP_TTL = 23326; L44: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L45: ... L55: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L56: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L57: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L87: try { L88: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L89: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

_support.jsView on unpkg · L4

4Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js -> _support.js L4: const crypto = require("crypto"); L5: const https = require("https"); L6: const os = require("os"); ... L43: const STAMP_TTL = 23326; L44: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L45: ... L55: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L56: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L57: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L87: try { L88: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L89: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

_support.jsView on unpkg · L4

114try { L115: const cp = require("child_process"); L116: if (isWin) {

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

_support.jsView on unpkg · L114

lib/telemetry.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-card@35.6.4 matchedPath = lib/telemetry.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:35.6.4 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/telemetry.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

4 flagged

_support.jsView file

4const crypto = require("crypto"); L5: const https = require("https"); L6: const os = require("os"); ... L43: const STAMP_TTL = 23326; L44: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L45: ... L55: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L56: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L57: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L87: try { L88: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L89: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

_support.jsView on unpkg · L4

4Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js -> _support.js L4: const crypto = require("crypto"); L5: const https = require("https"); L6: const os = require("os"); ... L43: const STAMP_TTL = 23326; L44: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L45: ... L55: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L56: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L57: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L87: try { L88: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L89: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

_support.jsView on unpkg · L4

114try { L115: const cp = require("child_process"); L116: if (isWin) {

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

_support.jsView on unpkg · L114

lib/telemetry.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-card@35.6.4 matchedPath = lib/telemetry.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:35.6.4 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/telemetry.jsView on unpkg