devez-vibe@1.10.1
Stable terminal UI for Codex and Claude Agent SDK
AI Security Review
scanned 9d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic postinstall setup modifies user-level agent skill directories, which warrants a warning for first-party agent extension setup. The inspected bridge settings path is request-dispatched, and the flagged benchmark file is a test harness; neither establishes a separate malicious behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest runs the skill installer automatically during postinstall.
- The installer targets user-level Codex and Claude skill directories.
- It copies bundled skills into those directories and prunes entries missing from the bundled versions.
- The flagged Claude settings path is part of a permissions update handled through bridge RPC dispatch, not the postinstall installer.
- The flagged Python file is identified in source as a before-and-after benchmark harness.
- The bridge permission handler changes Claude permission rules in a selected settings scope; the inspected path does not enable agent content telemetry or install plugins.
- The benchmark finding is in a test harness rather than an install entrypoint.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgSource creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to devez-vibe@1.10.1.
See all versions of devez-vibe for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of devez-vibe@1.10.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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