devez-vibe@1.10.11
Stable terminal UI for Codex and Claude Agent SDK
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic global installation of bundled agent skills creates a concrete agent extension lifecycle risk, though the inspected source does not establish a malicious attack. The bridge’s permission updates are runtime operations and do not add to the lifecycle finding.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package manifest runs the skill installer during postinstall.
- The installer targets the user’s Codex and Claude skill directories and selects two bundled skills.
- During postinstall, it copies each bundled skill into those directories and prunes files absent from the package copy.
- One installed skill guides assistants to try multiple methods when websites are blocked.
- The bridge’s Claude permission updates are exposed as a runtime request and can target user, project, or local settings.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgSource creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to devez-vibe@1.10.11.
See all versions of devez-vibe for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of devez-vibe@1.10.11 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.