devez-vibe@1.10.8
Stable terminal UI for Codex and Claude Agent SDK
AI Security Review
scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic global skill installation creates a concrete agent extension lifecycle risk, supporting a warning rather than a clean verdict. The native Windows executable remains unresolved, but the inspected source does not establish malicious behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The postinstall runs both the skill installer and dependency preparation.
- The installer copies bundled skills into global Codex and Claude skill directories and prunes files there.
- The bridge exposes Claude permission-setting changes through its runtime protocol.
- The Windows launcher starts a 26.7 MB native executable whose behavior the offline analysis could not resolve.
- The installer copies only the two named bundled skills; no install-time settings change is shown.
- The bridge permission changes are runtime protocol operations, not part of the postinstall path.
- Dependency preparation is limited to installing the search skill’s Python packages with pip.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgSource creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to devez-vibe@1.10.8.
See all versions of devez-vibe for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of devez-vibe@1.10.8 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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