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devez-vibe@1.6.48: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / devez-vibe / 1.6.48

devez-vibe@1.6.48

Stable terminal UI for Codex and Claude Agent SDK

AI Security Review

scanned 22d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. npm postinstall copies the bundled luna-loop skill into Codex and Claude user skill folders and prunes extra files there. Those folders belong to other vendors' agents, so a normal install plants agent instructions outside this package.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm install runs the postinstall script.

Impact

Unconsented persistence of agent instructions on foreign Codex and Claude control surfaces.

Mechanism

install-time copy and prune of a skill tree into Codex and Claude skill directories

Policy narrative

When npm installs this package, postinstall runs install-skills.mjs. That script copies the bundled luna-loop skill into the user's Codex and Claude skill folders, using home-directory defaults or CODEX_HOME and CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR, then deletes extra files in those folders. Codex and Claude are other vendors' agents, so a normal install plants and updates agent instructions outside this package without a dedicated user setup command.

AI rationale

postinstall copies and prunes a skill tree into Codex and Claude user skill directories, which is unconsented mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces. README wording and opt-in skill flags do not make that install-time write consented.

Evidence

package.jsoninstall-skills.mjsskills/luna-loop/SKILL.mdskills/luna-loop/~/.codex/skills/luna-loop~/.claude/skills/luna-loop

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node install-skills.mjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

40"scripts": { "postinstall": "node install-skills.mjs" },

High

Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence

package.json runs node install-skills.mjs from postinstall on npm install.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L40

install-skills.mjsView file

1import { L2: copyFileSync, L3: existsSync, L4: mkdirSync, L5: readdirSync, ... L14: const userHome = homedir(); L15: const codexHome = process.env.CODEX_HOME?.trim() || join(userHome, ".codex"); L16: const claudeHome = process.env.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR?.trim() || join(userHome, ".claude"); L17: ... L23: function copyTree(source, destination) { L24: mkdirSync(destination, { recursive: true }); L25: for (const entry of readdirSync(source, { withFileTypes: true })) {

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

install-skills.mjsView on unpkg · L1

14const userHome = homedir(); const codexHome = process.env.CODEX_HOME?.trim() || join(userHome, ".codex"); const claudeHome = process.env.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR?.trim() || join(userHome, ".claude"); const targets = [ { name: "Codex", path: join(codexHome, "skills", "luna-loop") }, { name: "Claude", path: join(claudeHome, "skills", "luna-loop") }, ];

High

Ai Review Evidence

install-skills.mjs copies luna-loop into the user's Codex and Claude skill directories with no extra command.

install-skills.mjsView on unpkg · L14

bin/dvz.exeView file

•path = bin/dvz.exe kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 24451584 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Native Binary

Package ships native binary artifacts.

bin/dvz.exeView on unpkg

bridge/claude-agent-sdk-bridge.mjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = devez-vibe@1.6.53 matchedPath = bridge/claude-agent-sdk-bridge.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:ZGV2ZXotdmliZQ:1.6.53 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bridge/claude-agent-sdk-bridge.mjsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 1466de81dd2a8cd0 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = devez-vibe@1.6.53 matchedPath = bridge/claude-agent-sdk-bridge.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:ZGV2ZXotdmliZQ:1.6.53 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 2 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

bridge/claude-agent-sdk-bridge.mjsView on unpkg