devez-vibe@1.9.1
Stable terminal UI for Codex and Claude Agent SDK
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is a real install-time agent-extension and environment-mutation risk, so it should be warned rather than marked clean. The inspected implementation is package-aligned and lacks concrete malware behavior, so the first-party extension lifecycle policy supports downgrade rather than blocking.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The postinstall hook automatically runs two setup scripts.
- The installer copies and prunes bundled skills in both Codex and Claude user skill directories.
- The postinstall setup runs pip with user-wide installation enabled.
- A bundled Codex skill directs the agent to launch a specific delegated model.
- No source path inspected sends credentials or local files to a remote endpoint.
- The bridge explicitly removes Anthropic credential variables before spawning its Claude CLI child.
- The agent-facing files are named package-bundled skills rather than hidden configuration changes.
Source & flagged code
10 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgSource creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to devez-vibe@1.9.1.
See all versions of devez-vibe for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of devez-vibe@1.9.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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