--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/devplatform-spa-ui/v/35.8.2" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/devplatform-spa-ui/v/35.8.2.md" package: "devplatform-spa-ui" report_status: "published" title: "devplatform-spa-ui@35.8.2 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "35.8.2" --- # devplatform-spa-ui@35.8.2 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — Arbitrary code execution as the importing application's user. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Remote Code Execution - **Selected version:** 35.8.2 - **Selected version is latest:** Yes - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) Importing the package activates a hidden remote binary loader. It downloads or reconstructs a platform payload, writes it to a temp directory, and launches it detached. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-05T15:17:18.992Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-05T15:17:45.142Z - **Download time:** 502 ms - **Static scan time:** 31 ms - **AI review time:** 25617 ms - **Total time:** 26150 ms ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Importing the package activates a hidden remote binary loader. It downloads or reconstructs a platform payload, writes it to a temp directory, and launches it detached. - **Trigger:** Any runtime require/import of index.js - **Impact:** Arbitrary code execution as the importing application's user. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, index.js, \_vendor.js, lib/telemetry.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-05T15:17:45.142Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** remote payload download, drop, and detached execution - **Attack narrative:** At module import, index.js silently requires \_vendor.js. Its init routine downloads a platform-specific executable from rotating workers.dev hosts or obtains base64 content through DNS TXT records at wel1.ru domains. It writes the payload to a temporary path, marks Unix files executable, and starts it through a detached shell or cmd.exe process. - **Rationale:** The hidden loader is import-reachable and performs unconsented remote binary execution; this is incompatible with the declared UI toolkit function. - **Files touched:** index.js, \_vendor.js, /tmp/.analytics\_state, /var/tmp/.cache\_\, C:\\Windows\\Temp\\analytics\_state, C:\\Windows\\Temp\\dotnet\_diag\_\.exe - **Network endpoints:** oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, net.dl.wel1.ru ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for:** index.js imports \_vendor.js on every package require., \_vendor.js downloads platform binaries from worker endpoints., \_vendor.js falls back to DNS TXT payloads at \*.wel1.ru., Downloaded bytes are written under /var/tmp or Windows Temp, chmodded, and spawned detached., Cache and silent error handling conceal repeated execution. - **Evidence against:** package.json contains no lifecycle scripts., Public UI API is otherwise minimal and does not need this loader. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** \_vendor.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L125: try { L126: const cp = require("child_process"); L127: if (isWin) { ``` ### 2. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 3. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 4. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 5. Critical: Download Execute - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** \_vendor.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L3: const os = require("os"); L4: const https = require("https"); L5: const fs = require("fs"); ... L47: const CACHE_TTL = 22965; L48: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L49: ... L59: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L60: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L61: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L96: try { L97: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L98: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r(""); ``` ### 6. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** \_vendor.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js -> _vendor.js L3: const os = require("os"); L4: const https = require("https"); L5: const fs = require("fs"); ... L47: const CACHE_TTL = 22965; L48: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L49: ... L59: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L60: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L61: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L96: try { L97: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L98: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r(""); ``` ### 7. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 8. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 85.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 0 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0 ## Package metadata - **Package:** devplatform-spa-ui - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 35.8.2 - **Version published:** 2026-08-05T13:37:58.459Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-05T15:17:45.142Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-08-05T15:17:45.142Z - **Known versions:** 1 - **Latest version:** 35.8.2 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** visual components - **Artifact files:** 7 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 87,443 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()