registry / dilema / 1.0.1

dilema@1.0.1

System-wide AI overlay. Hidden from screen sharing.

AI Security Review

scanned 2h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

User running the CLI starts a stealth Electron overlay with watchdog persistence. On Windows it targets TestPad/exam windows, injects bundled unprotect.dll into protected processes, bypasses screen-capture protections, captures screen content, and sends screenshots/text to Groq for answers.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

User invokes `dilema`/`dilema start` CLI command

Impact

Bypasses exam/proctoring display protections, hides itself from screen sharing, persists/restarts under Microsoft-like names, and transmits captured screen content to an external AI API.

Mechanism

stealth persistence plus DLL injection and protected-window screenshot capture

Attack narrative

After `dilema start`, the CLI launches a detached guard/daemon, disguises Electron as Microsoft Edge WebView2, and installs a scheduled task for minute-by-minute resurrection. The daemon repeatedly finds TestPad/exam windows, injects a bundled DLL via PowerShell CreateRemoteThread/LoadLibraryW, captures otherwise protected content, and forwards screenshots or extracted text to Groq to solve questions while the overlay is hidden from screen sharing.

Rationale

Source inspection confirms intentional stealth, persistence, DLL injection into exam software, screen-protection bypass, and external AI submission; this is concrete abusive behavior even though it is user-command triggered rather than npm lifecycle triggered. The scanner's encrypted-payload wording is less central than the directly readable injection, disguise, and watchdog code.

Evidence

package.jsondist/cli/index.jscli/guard.cjsdesktop/dist/daemon.cjsdesktop/resources/inject_dll.ps1desktop/resources/capture_testpad.ps1desktop/resources/find_testpad.ps1README.mddesktop/resources/unprotect.dll%APPDATA%/Dilemma/launch.json%APPDATA%/Dilemma/resurrect.js%APPDATA%/dilemma/Dilemma.pid%APPDATA%/dilemma/guard.pidnode_modules/electron/dist/msedgewebview2.exe

Network endpoints2

api.groq.comconsole.groq.com/keys

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Malicious at 97.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

dist/cli/index.js start spawns hidden daemon/guard and creates Windows scheduled task MicrosoftEdgeWebView2Update every minute
dist/cli/index.js copies electron.exe to msedgewebview2.exe and rewrites metadata to Microsoft Edge WebView2
cli/guard.cjs disguises process title as Windows Audio Device Graph Isolation and auto-restarts daemon
desktop/dist/daemon.cjs runs ensureTestpadUnprotected on startup and every 5s
desktop/resources/inject_dll.ps1 performs OpenProcess/VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory/CreateRemoteThread DLL injection
desktop/resources/capture_testpad.ps1 says it bypasses SetWindowDisplayAffinity and captures TestPad/exam windows

Evidence against

package.json has no npm lifecycle hooks, so behavior is not install-time
network use is package-aligned Groq API request for AI overlay responses
CLI exposes stop command and daemon has stop flag cleanup paths

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNativeBindingsNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 6 file(s), 504 KB of source, external domains: console.groq.com, gist.github.com, github.com, json-schema.org, mathiasbynens.be, raw.githubusercontent.com, spec.openapis.org, stackoverflow.com, tools.ietf.org, wiki.debian.org, www.w3.org

Source & flagged code

8 flagged

dist/cli/index.jsView file

Lines 1-33javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2var __require = /* @__PURE__ */ ((x) => typeof require !== "undefined" ? require : typeof Proxy !== "undefined" ? new Proxy(x, {

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

dist/cli/index.jsView file

13import { fileURLToPath } from "url"; L14: import { spawn, execSync } from "child_process"; L15: import { createRequire } from "module";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L13

13Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/cli/index.js spawns desktop/dist/daemon.cjs; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L13: import { fileURLToPath } from "url"; L14: import { spawn, execSync } from "child_process"; L15: import { createRequire } from "module"; ... L23: // shared/crypto.ts L24: import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createHash, randomBytes } from "crypto"; L25: var ALGO = "aes-256-gcm"; L26: function machineScopedSecret() { L27: const basis = `${process.platform}|${process.arch}|${process.env.USERNAME ?? process.env.USER ?? "user"}`; L28: return createHash("sha256").update(basis).digest(); ... L118: const seeds = []; L119: if (typeof __dirname !== "undefined") { L120: seeds.push(__dirname);

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L13

13import { fileURLToPath } from "url"; L14: import { spawn, execSync } from "child_process"; L15: import { createRequire } from "module"; ... L23: // shared/crypto.ts L24: import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createHash, randomBytes } from "crypto"; L25: var ALGO = "aes-256-gcm"; L26: function machineScopedSecret() { L27: const basis = `${process.platform}|${process.arch}|${process.env.USERNAME ?? process.env.USER ?? "user"}`; L28: return createHash("sha256").update(basis).digest(); ... L118: const seeds = []; L119: if (typeof __dirname !== "undefined") { L120: seeds.push(__dirname);

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L13

desktop/dist/daemon.cjsView file

•context = if (basename.length <= LIMIT_BASENAME_LENGTH)\n return filePath;\n const truncable = /^(\.?)(.*?)((?:\.[^.]+)?(?:\.tmp-\d{10}[a-f0-9]{6})?)$/.exec(basename);\n if (!truncable)\n return filePath;\n const truncationLength = basename.length - LIMIT_BASENAME_LENGTH;\n return `${filePath.slice(0, -basename.length)}${truncable[1]}${truncable[2].slice(0, -truncationLength)}${truncable[3]}`;\n }\n};\nnode_default(Temp.purgeSyncAll);\nvar temp_default = Temp;\n\n// node_modules/atomically/dist/index.js\nfunction writeFileSync(filePath, data, options = DEFAULT_WRITE_OPTIONS) {\n if (isString(options))\n return writeFileSync(filePath, data, { encoding: options });\n const timeout = options.timeout ?? DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SYNC;\n const retryOptions = { timeout };\n let tempDisposer = null;\n let tempPath = null;\n let fd = null;\n try {\n const filePathReal = dist_default.attempt.realpathSync(filePath);\n const filePathExists = !!filePathReal;\n filePath = filePathReal || filePath;\n [tempPath, tempDisposer] = temp_defau

Critical

Encrypted Payload Temp Execution

Source decrypts an embedded payload, writes it to disk, and executes it through a child process.

desktop/dist/daemon.cjsView on unpkg

11393const result = (0, import_node_child_process.execSync)( L11394: `powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "${script}"`, L11395: { timeout: 4e3, windowsHide: true, encoding: "utf8" }

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

desktop/dist/daemon.cjsView on unpkg · L11393

2945sourceCode = this.opts.code.process(sourceCode, sch); L2946: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); L2947: const validate = makeValidate(this, this.scope.get());

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

desktop/dist/daemon.cjsView on unpkg · L2945

desktop/resources/unprotect.dllView file

•path = desktop/resources/unprotect.dll kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 14336 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Native Binary

Package ships native binary artifacts.

desktop/resources/unprotect.dllView on unpkg

desktop/resources/inject_dll.ps1View file

•path = desktop/resources/inject_dll.ps1 kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 2304 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

desktop/resources/inject_dll.ps1View on unpkg

Findings

1 Critical3 High6 Medium5 Low

CriticalEncrypted Payload Temp Executiondesktop/dist/daemon.cjs

HighChild Processdist/cli/index.js

HighShelldesktop/dist/daemon.cjs

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/cli/index.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumInstall Persistencedist/cli/index.js

MediumShips Native Binarydesktop/resources/unprotect.dll

MediumShips Build Helperdesktop/resources/inject_dll.ps1

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowScripts Present

LowEvaldesktop/dist/daemon.cjs

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

desktop/dist/daemon.cjsView file

Lines 2925-2965javascript

2925 validateName,

2926 ValidationError: _ValidationError,

2927 schema: sch.schema,

2928 schemaEnv: sch,

2929 rootId,

2930 baseId: sch.baseId || rootId,

2931 schemaPath: codegen_1.nil,

2932 errSchemaPath: sch.schemaPath || (this.opts.jtd ? "" : "#"),

2933 errorPath: (0, codegen_1._)`""`,

2934 opts: this.opts,

2935 self: this

2936 };

2937 let sourceCode;

2938 try {

2939 this._compilations.add(sch);

2940 (0, validate_1.validateFunctionCode)(schemaCxt);

2941 gen.optimize(this.opts.code.optimize);

2942 const validateCode = gen.toString();

2943 sourceCode = `${gen.scopeRefs(names_1.default.scope)}return ${validateCode}`;

2944 if (this.opts.code.process)

2945 sourceCode = this.opts.code.process(sourceCode, sch);

2946 const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode);

2947 const validate = makeValidate(this, this.scope.get());

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

desktop/dist/daemon.cjsView on unpkg · L2945

2948 this.scope.value(validateName, { ref: validate });

2949 validate.errors = null;

2950 validate.schema = sch.schema;

2951 validate.schemaEnv = sch;

2952 if (sch.$async)

2953 validate.$async = true;

2954 if (this.opts.code.source === true) {

2955 validate.source = { validateName, validateCode, scopeValues: gen._values };

2956 }

2957 if (this.opts.unevaluated) {

2958 const { props, items } = schemaCxt;

2959 validate.evaluated = {

2960 props: props instanceof codegen_1.Name ? void 0 : props,

2961 items: items instanceof codegen_1.Name ? void 0 : items,

2962 dynamicProps: props instanceof codegen_1.Name,

2963 dynamicItems: items instanceof codegen_1.Name

2964 };

2965 if (validate.source)

Lines 11373-11413javascript

11373// desktop/src/capture.ts

11374var import_node_child_process = require("child_process");

11375var import_node_fs5 = require("fs");

11376var import_node_path6 = require("path");

11377function findResource(name) {

11378 const

Critical

Encrypted Payload Temp Execution

Source decrypts an embedded payload, writes it to disk, and executes it through a child process.

desktop/dist/daemon.cjsView on unpkg