The cloud-selection path forwards a file-sourced API key to an undocumented default relay, creating a credential exposure risk. Because this path requires an explicit feature call and the key's intended service is unclear, the source does not establish a definite credential theft attack.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
An application explicitly calls ensembleSelect or cascadeSelect; the request path reads DIWEN_KEYS_FILE and uses the default relay unless overridden.
Impact
The default relay receives the supplied credential and request content; source evidence does not establish whether the key is intended for that relay or belongs to another service.
Mechanism
The code parses sk- values from the key file, assigns a selected value as the API key, and sends it as a Bearer token to the configured endpoint.
Evidence
index.mjsdist/core.mjsREADME.mdDIWEN_KEYS_FILE (or the hard-coded fallback path C:/Users/p/.openclaw/workspace/大龙虾互动区/12-D.txt)
Network endpoints1
8888ok.cc/v1/chat/completions