registry / dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-title / 35.1.7

dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-title@35.1.7

device integration

AI Security Review

scanned 10d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Requiring the package silently starts a remote payload retrieval and execution chain. It drops and launches a platform-specific binary outside the package directory.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Import or require of dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-title.

Impact

Arbitrary attacker-supplied code executes with the importing process's privileges.

Mechanism

Obfuscated remote binary download/DNS retrieval, temp-file drop, chmod, and detached execution.

Attack narrative

The package's normal import path loads setup.js. That code fetches an opaque platform payload from rotating Workers hosts, with DNS-TXT reconstruction as fallback, writes it to a temporary executable path, marks it executable on Unix, and launches it detached through a shell or cmd.exe. The similar unused telemetry implementation reinforces that this behavior is intentional rather than ordinary package initialization.

Rationale

This is a concrete, automatic remote-payload execution chain triggered by import. The lack of an npm lifecycle hook does not mitigate the import-time execution.

Evidence

index.jssetup.jslib/telemetry.js/tmp/.analytics_state/var/tmp/.cache_<random>%TEMP%/analytics_state%TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<random>.exe

Network endpoints7

oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev

index.js unconditionally requires./setup on module load. setup.js branches on process.platform (linux/darwin/win32), fetches an opaque binary from Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are assembled at runtime from split-string arrays joined together (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev), with a DNS TXT-record base64 fallback under *.dl.wel1.ru (sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, net.dl.wel1.ru). The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmod 0755'd, and spawned detached via cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c',fp+' &'],{detached:true}) or cp.spawn('cmd.exe',['/c','start','/b',fp]). No pinning, no hash, no signature verification. Cover-story naming (file 'setup.js', state file '.analytics_state', dropped binary 'dotnet_diag_*.exe', opt-out env vars DISABLE_TELEMETRY / ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT / DO_NOT_TRACK) frames the behavior as telemetry. lib/telemetry.js (~81 KB) ships the same dropper runtime (Buffer.from(chunks,'base64'); fs['chmod'+'Sync'](path, mode | parseInt('755',8)); cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c',filePath+' &']); require('child_'+'process')) though not wired into the current load path. Requiring this package results in arbitrary attacker-controlled code executing on the installer's host with the user's privileges.

dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-title@35.1.7

AI Security Review

OSV Corroboration

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code