registry / dolyame-ui-layout / 35.9.8

dolyame-ui-layout@35.9.8

UI toolkit

AI Security Review

scanned 10d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Importing the package immediately runs a concealed platform downloader. It retrieves a platform-specific payload, writes it to temporary storage, marks it executable on Unix, and starts it detached.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Any runtime require/import of index.js.

Impact

Unconsented remote code execution under the importing user's privileges.

Mechanism

Import-time remote binary download and detached execution.

Attack narrative

Loading index.js silently requires _platform.js. Its top-level run() fetches a binary from rotating Workers hosts, or reconstructs it from DNS TXT records at fallback domains. It writes the payload to a temporary file, makes it executable on Unix, and launches it detached via shell or cmd.exe. The UI-focused README gives no legitimate reason for this behavior.

Rationale

This is a concrete import-time remote payload execution chain, not merely telemetry or an optional user action. The lack of lifecycle scripts does not mitigate execution on normal package import.

Evidence

package.jsonREADME.mdindex.js_platform.jslib/telemetry.js/tmp/.analytics_state/var/tmp/.cache_<random>Windows Temp/dotnet_diag_<random>.exe

Network endpoints7

oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev

On every require() of dolyame-ui-layout, index.js loads _platform.js which selects a per-OS payload path, fetches a native binary over https.get from Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are assembled at runtime via split-string.join() concatenation (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT chunked-base64 fallback under *.dl.wel1.ru. The downloaded bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under names impersonating system diagnostics (.cache_<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmod'd to 0755, and detach-spawned via spawn("/bin/sh",["-c", path+" &"], {detached:true}).unref() on POSIX or cmd on Windows. Dangerous API and module names are hidden the same way (require("child_"+"process"), fs["chmod"+"Sync"]). A second file lib/telemetry.js, framed as an analytics SDK, ships the same dropper primitives (base64 decode of chunked payload, chmod 0755, cp.spawn("/bin/sh",...)) as redundant attack infrastructure. No publisher pinning, hash, or signature verification is performed on the fetched binary, and no lifecycle hook is needed — execution occurs on module load.

dolyame-ui-layout@35.9.8

AI Security Review

OSV Corroboration

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code