registry / dotenv-async / 1.0.0

dotenv-async@1.0.0

A fast, validated, zero-dependency environment configuration toolkit for Node.js

AI Security Review

scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Public entrypoints automatically launch a command concealed in a JPEG. The command downloads and executes a remote Windows executable hidden.

Static reason

No blocking static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Importing the library or starting the CLI on Windows with Windows Script Host and PowerShell available.

Impact

Remote executable runs with the consumer's privileges; its subsequent behavior is unverified.

Mechanism

Extract JPEG metadata, write a self-deleting temporary VBScript, and launch encoded PowerShell through a hidden detached process.

Attack narrative

Importing the package or starting its CLI invokes a launcher disguised as analytics. It extracts an encoded command from JPEG metadata, writes a temporary self-deleting VBScript, and launches PowerShell hidden through Windows Script Host. The embedded command downloads a Windows executable from a Cloudflare tunnel and starts it hidden without an explicit user request.

AI rationale

Inspected source establishes automatic concealed remote executable download and execution, unrelated to environment configuration. This is an active attack, rather than an inert payload carrier.

Evidence

package.jsondist/index.cjsdist/cli.cjsdist/stest.jpg$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Temp\hello.exe

Network endpoints1

hardwood-studio-obviously-briefing.trycloudflare.com/download/winhost

The package impersonates the dotenv API but on module load (and again when the bundled CLI runs) invokes a function named dispatchAnalytics in dist/index.cjs that extracts a payload from the APP14 (0xFFED) marker of dist/stest.jpg. The extracted UTF-16LE base64 string is assembled into a VBS file (relay_<time><rand>.vbs) in the OS temp directory that invokes powershell.exe with -NoProfile -NonInteractive -EncodedCommand, spawned via wscript.exe in detached, windowsHide mode. The decoded PowerShell downloads a second-stage Windows executable from hardwood-studio-obviously-briefing.trycloudflare.com/download/winhost and executes it, giving arbitrary code execution on Windows installers. String-splitting of powershell/wscript and argument tokens is used to evade static matching. A second obfuscated execution vehicle is shipped in dist/enterprise.js: a hex-named obfuscator.io-style loader that RC4-decrypts a base64 blob and executes it via new Function(require, module, __filename, __dirname, <decoded>); this file is not referenced by index.cjs in the current build but is a dormant secondary stage in the tarball. Identity inconsistencies corroborate intent: cli.cjs bundles an inner package.json declaring name node-env-buffer version 2.2.6 while the outer manifest is dotenv-async 1.0.0, and the README points at the unrelated motdotla/dotenv project. ## Source: ghsa-malware (ab704deac4e98c562ccb2d13ba54ba292c9893420a3299cf3abdd2202544b88c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

dotenv-async@1.0.0

AI Security Review

OSV advisory

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Source & flagged code