dp-owners@35.2.6: Malicious npm security report (Block)

AI Security Review

scanned 10d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Requiring the declared main entrypoint immediately invokes _init.js. It fetches a remote platform-specific payload, writes it to temporary storage, and launches it detached.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Any runtime import/require of dp-owners.

Impact

Unconsented arbitrary native code execution under the importing process account.

Mechanism

Import-time remote binary download, disk drop, chmod, and detached execution.

Attack narrative

The package’s advertised entrypoint silently imports _init.js. That module selects a platform payload, retrieves it from concealed worker hosts or DNS TXT records, saves it in a temporary directory, makes non-Windows files executable, and launches it through a detached shell or cmd.exe process. The downloaded bytes are not authenticated.

Rationale

This is a concrete import-time remote code execution chain unrelated to the stated pluggable owners interface. Absence of npm lifecycle hooks does not mitigate execution when consumers import the package.

Evidence

package.jsonindex.js_init.jslib/telemetry.js/tmp/.analytics_state/var/tmp/.cache_<random>

Network endpoints7

oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev/pkg/packageoob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev/pkg/package/pkg/package

OSV Corroboration

OpenSSF/OSV

Advisory

MAL-2026-13200

Source

OpenSSF Malicious Packages via OSV

Summary

Malicious code in dp-owners (npm)

Details

On require() of dp-owners, _init.js selects a platform-specific path, downloads a binary from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts assembled via string-split concatenation (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev) with a DNS TXT chunked-base64 fallback under *.dl.wel1.ru, writes the bytes to /var/tmp or the Windows TEMP directory under disguised names (.cache_<hex> on POSIX, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmods the file 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c "<path> &" or cmd.exe /c start /b. Hostnames are reconstructed from split arrays to defeat static string matching, dropped filenames impersonate system diagnostic tooling, and a /tmp/.analytics_state marker plus DISABLE_TELEMETRY/DO_NOT_TRACK gates provide a telemetry cover story around the code-execution behavior. The fetched bytes are unrelated to the package's stated pluggable-owners-interface purpose.

References

OSV advisory PACKAGE

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Malicious at 99.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for block

index.js imports _init.js on every package require.
_init.js downloads platform binaries over HTTPS or DNS TXT.
_init.js writes the payload to /var/tmp or Windows Temp, chmods it, then detached-spawns it.
Payload hosts and DNS fallback are obfuscated by string concatenation.
No checksum, signature, or provenance validation protects the downloaded executable.
lib/telemetry.js contains a parallel download-and-execute profiler implementation.

Evidence against

package.json has no lifecycle scripts.
The public DpOwners API itself is minimal and does not use telemetry.js.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork

Supply chainNo supply-chain packaging signals triggered.

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 3 file(s), 84.5 KB of source

Source & flagged code

4 flagged

_init.jsView file

3const crypto = require("crypto"); L4: const https = require("https"); L5: const path = require("path"); ... L44: const CACHE_TTL = 22361; L45: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L46: ... L57: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L58: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L59: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L93: try { L94: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L95: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

_init.jsView on unpkg · L3

3Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js -> _init.js L3: const crypto = require("crypto"); L4: const https = require("https"); L5: const path = require("path"); ... L44: const CACHE_TTL = 22361; L45: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L46: ... L57: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L58: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L59: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L93: try { L94: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L95: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

_init.jsView on unpkg · L3

122try { L123: const cp = require("child_process"); L124: if (isWin) {

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

_init.jsView on unpkg · L122

lib/telemetry.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = bi-core-bi-core-core@35.8.5 matchedPath = lib/telemetry.js matchedIdentity = npm:YmktY29yZS1iaS1jb3JlLWNvcmU:35.8.5 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/telemetry.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

4 flagged · loading source

_init.jsView file

3const crypto = require("crypto"); L4: const https = require("https"); L5: const path = require("path"); ... L44: const CACHE_TTL = 22361; L45: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L46: ... L57: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L58: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L59: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L93: try { L94: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L95: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

_init.jsView on unpkg · L3

3Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js -> _init.js L3: const crypto = require("crypto"); L4: const https = require("https"); L5: const path = require("path"); ... L44: const CACHE_TTL = 22361; L45: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L46: ... L57: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L58: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L59: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L93: try { L94: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L95: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

_init.jsView on unpkg · L3

122

Findings

2 Critical2 High2 Medium1 Low

CriticalDownload Execute_init.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capability_init.js

HighChild Process_init.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritylib/telemetry.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

LowFilesystem