droid@0.190.0
Factory Droid CLI - AI-powered software engineering agent
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no concrete malicious behavior, but the install-time unverified remote native-binary fallback is a real staged-payload supply-chain risk. This warrants a warning rather than a block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs postinstall via install.js.
- install.js downloads a platform-native tarball fallback from registry.npmjs.org.
- Downloaded archive contents are written executable and invoked with --version during install.
- No checksum/signature verification is performed for the fetched tarball.
- Installer limits file replacement to its own bin/droid shim and backup.
- Network auth header is only added for npmjs.org requests.
- No credential harvesting, exfiltration, AI-agent config writes, or shell-profile writes were found.
- bin/droid only launches the selected bundled platform binary with user CLI arguments.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time source downloads a native archive from a fixed external host without transport verification, extracts it, and installs an executable payload.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L9Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to droid@0.190.0.
See all versions of droid for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of droid@0.190.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.