The package has a legitimate push and cloud-link purpose, but it silently uploads previously stored phone push tokens and device metadata to its default cloud service on startup. Since this collection is not disclosed, classify it as suspicious telemetry rather than a block-level attack.
Static reason
No blocking static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Plugin initialization schedules the token backfill without a separate user action.
Impact
The cloud service receives phone push recipient tokens and device metadata even when the user has not explicitly requested a sync in that session.
Mechanism
The backfill reads locally stored push tokens and calls the cloud registration endpoint with the token and node ID; optional device ID and model are also included.
Evidence
lib/index.jslib/cloud-link.mjslib/hw-push.mjs
Network endpoints3
gaoshou25.cn/api/cloud/push/registeroauth-login.cloud.huawei.com/oauth2/v3/token/v3/