--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/eddieseddies/v/1.0.4" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/eddieseddies/v/1.0.4.md" package: "eddieseddies" report_status: "published" title: "eddieseddies@1.0.4 npm security report" verdict: "clean" version: "1.0.4" --- # eddieseddies@1.0.4 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Allowed — no malicious behavior detected** — No malicious behavior detected. 12 low-signal pattern(s) reviewed. - **Verdict:** Clean - **Product-default install policy:** Allow - **Firewall policy:** No policy match - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** None published - **Selected version:** 1.0.4 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: clean; recommendation: mark clean. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The credential hint resolves to signed Eddies API requests, with the identity key used to create signatures rather than sent as raw data. The automatic updater is limited to joined instances, can be disabled, and delegates updates to the x0x and ant updaters; no concrete malicious behavior was found. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Clean - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 91.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-12T22:26:22.120Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-12T22:28:40.538Z - **Download time:** 770 ms - **Static scan time:** 329 ms - **AI review time:** 137318 ms - **Total time:** 138418 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** No attack was identified. The inspected network activity supports Eddies payment flows, and the updater delegates to the configured x0x and ant updaters. - **Trigger:** MCP starts its update timer for a joined identity unless EDDIES\_AUTO\_UPDATE is set to 0; payment operations run through payment tools and routes. - **Impact:** No malicious impact was established: the inspected paths do not transfer the raw identity key or perform unrelated automatic account actions. - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-12T22:28:40.538Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The package signs Eddies gateway requests and passes payment payloads to payment endpoints. Its updater asks the configured x0x daemon to apply updates and runs ant update. - **Rationale:** The credential hint resolves to signed Eddies API requests, with the identity key used to create signatures rather than sent as raw data. The automatic updater is limited to joined instances, can be disabled, and delegates updates to the x0x and ant updaters; no concrete malicious behavior was found. ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Clean - **Confidence:** 91.0% - **Recommended action:** mark\_clean - **Intent class:** Benign - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for AI clean decision:** package.json exposes the client and MCP entrypoints and has only a test script; no install lifecycle hook is declared., The identity signs Eddies writes using its key, and MCP sends the signed request to the configured gateway. I found no transfer of the raw identity key., The flagged gateway and chain paths handle Eddies payment charges, pool transfers, allowances, and claims; they do not show unrelated automatic account actions., The MCP updater runs only for a joined identity, unless disabled with EDDIES\_AUTO\_UPDATE=0; it is also exposed as an explicit tool., The updater delegates to the configured x0x daemon and ant updater. The inspected code does not show a separate payload download or execution path. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to eddieseddies@1.0.4. - Review the evidence and your use of eddieseddies@1.0.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 2. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 3. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 4. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 5. High: Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** mcp.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines credential-like environment material and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L25: // The wire is MCP's stdio transport: newline-delimited JSON-RPC 2.0 on L26: // stdin/stdout. Nothing but protocol goes to stdout; notes go to stderr. L27: ... L30: import { join } from 'node:path'; L31: import { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; L32: import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createHash, createHmac, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'; L33: import { EddiesIdentity, DEFAULT_GATEWAY } from './identity.js'; ... L39: L40: const username = (process.env.EDDIES_USERNAME || '').trim().toLowerCase(); L41: const gateway = (process.env.EDDIES_GATEWAY || DEFAULT_GATEWAY).replace(/\/+$/, ''); ... L45: const UNJOINED = 'eddie'; L46: // One allowance in the private pool per ex420-chain seller this AI pays, ``` ### 6. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** mcp.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L25: // The wire is MCP's stdio transport: newline-delimited JSON-RPC 2.0 on L26: // stdin/stdout. Nothing but protocol goes to stdout; notes go to stderr. L27: ... L30: import { join } from 'node:path'; L31: import { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; L32: import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createHash, createHmac, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'; L33: import { EddiesIdentity, DEFAULT_GATEWAY } from './identity.js'; ... L39: L40: const username = (process.env.EDDIES_USERNAME || '').trim().toLowerCase(); L41: const gateway = (process.env.EDDIES_GATEWAY || DEFAULT_GATEWAY).replace(/\/+$/, ''); ... L45: const UNJOINED = 'eddie'; L46: // One allowance in the private pool per ex420-chain seller this AI pays, ``` ### 7. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** mcp.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> mcp.js L25: // The wire is MCP's stdio transport: newline-delimited JSON-RPC 2.0 on L26: // stdin/stdout. Nothing but protocol goes to stdout; notes go to stderr. L27: ... L30: import { join } from 'node:path'; L31: import { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; L32: import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createHash, createHmac, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'; L33: import { EddiesIdentity, DEFAULT_GATEWAY } from './identity.js'; ... L39: L40: const username = (process.env.EDDIES_USERNAME || '').trim().toLowerCase(); L41: const gateway = (process.env.EDDIES_GATEWAY || DEFAULT_GATEWAY).replace(/\/+$/, ''); ... L45: const UNJOINED = 'eddie'; L46: // One allowance in the private pool per ex420-chain seller this AI pays, ``` ### 8. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 9. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 10. Medium: Ships Wasm Module - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** wasm/eddies\_ledger\_bg.wasm - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships WebAssembly modules. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = wasm/eddies_ledger_bg.wasm kind = wasm_module sizeBytes = 2179481 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 11. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 12. Critical: Manifest Confusion - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 95.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Tarball package.json differs from the npm registry version manifest for scripts or dependency sets. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts registry_only=start ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 2 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 2 ### Published dependency entries - @noble/hashes ^2.0.0 (Dependency) - @noble/post-quantum ^0.5.0 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** eddieseddies - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.0.4 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-10-12T22:16:33.125Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-10-08T18:45:00.670Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-11-01T08:53:36.686Z - **Known versions:** 4 - **Latest version:** 1.0.6 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** ex420 — x402 for Eddies. Accept payments with a single line of code; HTTP 402 settled in €$ on the Eddies ledger. - **Maintainers:** eddieseddies - **Keywords:** x402, ex420, mcp, mcp-server, model-context-protocol, ai-agents, agent-payments, machine-payments, micropayments, http-402, payments, pay-per-crawl - **Artifact files:** 15 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 5,860,814 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Homepage]()