registry / edwin8600 / 1.3.4

edwin8600@1.3.4

Pasos para publicar en npm

AI Security Review

scanned 8h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

An administrator-executed PowerShell helper provisions persistent remote SSH access for an embedded third-party key. It also opens SSH to the network and can enroll the machine into a Tailscale tailnet using a bundled auth key.

Static reason

No blocking static signals were detected.

Trigger

User explicitly runs `tailcale/instalar_ssh_servidor.ps1` as Administrator.

Impact

A package author-controlled identity can remotely access the affected Windows account; the device may also join an external Tailscale network.

Mechanism

Installs an embedded SSH authorization key, enables OpenSSH/firewall access, and enrolls Tailscale with a hard-coded key.

Attack narrative

If a victim follows the packaged administrator PowerShell helper, it enables OpenSSH, opens firewall port 22, and writes the embedded `edwin@EDWIN` public key to the victim account's `authorized_keys`. The script additionally offers its bundled Tailscale auth key as the recommended option and runs `tailscale up`, potentially joining the host to the key owner's tailnet. This creates persistent, author-controlled remote-access paths despite having no npm install hook.

Rationale

The package contains an explicit remote-access provisioning script that authorizes a bundled third-party SSH key and default Tailscale enrollment credential. Although it is not install-time, this is concrete persistence and unauthorized remote-access functionality.

Evidence

package.jsontailcale/instalar_ssh_servidor.ps1ware/cdp_recorder.pyware/iniciar_captura.py$env:SystemDrive\Users\$username\.ssh\id_ed25519$env:SystemDrive\Users\$username\.ssh\authorized_keys$env:ProgramData\ssh\sshd_config

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Malicious at 98.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for block

`tailcale/instalar_ssh_servidor.ps1` embeds a private SSH key and writes it into the current user's `.ssh` directory.
The same script installs its public key as `.ssh/authorized_keys`, granting `edwin@EDWIN` SSH access.
It enables and starts `sshd`, opens inbound TCP/22, enables public-key auth, and restarts SSH.
It embeds a default Tailscale auth key and recommends using it, then runs `tailscale up --auth-key`.
No npm lifecycle hooks exist; the remote-access changes require explicit PowerShell execution.

Evidence against

`package.json` has no `scripts`, `bin`, or executable JavaScript entrypoint; its main is `steps.txt`.
The web-capture Python tools are user-launched and write local session artifacts; no package-owned exfiltration endpoint was found.

Behavioral surface

SourceNo risky source behavior triggered.

Supply chainNo supply-chain packaging signals triggered.

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 0 file(s), 0 B of source

Source & flagged code

1 flagged

tailcale/instalar_ssh_servidor.ps1View file

•path = tailcale/instalar_ssh_servidor.ps1 kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 25062 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

tailcale/instalar_ssh_servidor.ps1View on unpkg

Source & flagged code

1 flagged · loading source

tailcale/instalar_ssh_servidor.ps1View file

•path = tailcale/instalar_ssh_servidor.ps1 kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 25062 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

tailcale/instalar_ssh_servidor.ps1View on unpkg

Findings

1 Medium

MediumShips Build Helpertailcale/instalar_ssh_servidor.ps1