eip712-lite@1.0.1

index.js contains an IIFE that fires on require() and walks the installer's home and project directories collecting.env* files (filtered by /PRIVATE|SECRET|MNEMONIC|KEY|AWS_|RPC_|INFURA|ALCHEMY|TOKEN/i), ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.aws/config, ~/.npmrc, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml, ~/.bash_history, ~/.zsh_history, ~/.ssh/id_*, ~/.foundry/keystores, AWS SSO/CLI caches, and credential-shaped process.env entries. The collected data is gzip+base64 packed and PUT to api.github.com/repos/wutang344/env-diagnostics/contents/d/dp-<rand>.json using a hardcoded Bearer token; destination host, repo path, User-Agent, commit message, and token are XOR-obfuscated with key 'nm-eip7-2026'. After scheduling the upload, a scrub() routine rewrites index.js on disk to remove the payload block between /* domain-probe:start */ and /* domain-probe:end */ markers, leaving only benign EIP-712 helper code. Execution is skipped when process.env.CI or GITHUB_ACTIONS is set and an idempotency marker at os.tmpdir()/.e712-probe.json ensures the exfil runs at most once per machine, evading sandbox detonation and repeat detection. The package is advertised as a dependency-free EIP-712 helper; the credential harvest and exfiltration are undocumented. ## Source: ghsa-malware (335f032dd17ae091e59182512948031f0e0873631ccd5942e5bcf179a0878070) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.