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emp-code@0.5.8: Malicious npm security report (Block) | LPM Firewall

registry / emp-code / 0.5.8

emp-code@0.5.8

EMP CLI - coding agent with full-screen TUI (ink, clickable tool output, mouse, plan mode, markdown, vision) and 18 providers. Runs great on any light PC / weak CPU / old motherboard. Sessions, context, effort, web search, background tasks, revert.

AI Security Review

scanned 3h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Starting the web interface exposes an unauthenticated service on all network interfaces. A remote client can register and launch an arbitrary MCP process, while command approvals are enabled by default.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

The user runs emp web and a network-reachable client sends a POST request to /api/mcp/servers.

Impact

A remote attacker can execute commands with the permissions of the EMP process and persist an MCP command configuration.

Mechanism

Unauthenticated command registration followed by child-process execution.

Attack narrative

After an explicit emp web launch, the server binds to all interfaces and turns on automatic approval. Any reachable client can submit an MCP server command through the web API; the server saves it and reloads MCP clients, which spawns that command with the EMP process environment. Separately, the install hook can place an environment-selected executable in dist, and the CLI executes it on its next launch without verification.

Rationale

The exposed web API provides a direct, unauthenticated path from a remote request to child-process execution. The conditional unverified executable download and automatic later execution add a separate supply-chain execution risk.

Evidence

emp-web/server.cjslib/mcp.jsscripts/postinstall.jsbin/emp.js.emp/mcp.jsondist/emp-win.exedist/emp-macosdist/emp-linux

Network endpoints2

Source & flagged code

14 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

bin/emp.jsView file

4try { L5: const exeName = process.platform === 'win32' ? 'emp-win.exe' : process.platform === 'darwin' ? 'emp-macos' : 'emp-linux'; L6: const exePath = require('path').join(__dirname, '..', 'dist', exeName); L7: if (require('fs').existsSync(exePath)) { L8: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L9: const child = spawn(exePath, process.argv.slice(2), { stdio: 'inherit' }); ... L31: L32: const VERSION = require('../package.json').version; L33: const versionMod = require('../lib/version'); ... L39: const msg = err && err.stack || err && err.message || String(err); L40: try { process.stderr.write(`\n[emp: uncaught] ${msg}\n`); } catch {} L41:

Critical

Persistence Backdoor

Source writes persistence or remote-access backdoor material.

bin/emp.jsView on unpkg · L4

4Trigger-reachable chain: scripts.start -> bin/emp.js L4: try { L5: const exeName = process.platform === 'win32' ? 'emp-win.exe' : process.platform === 'darwin' ? 'emp-macos' : 'emp-linux'; L6: const exePath = require('path').join(__dirname, '..', 'dist', exeName); L7: if (require('fs').existsSync(exePath)) { L8: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L9: const child = spawn(exePath, process.argv.slice(2), { stdio: 'inherit' }); ... L31: L32: const VERSION = require('../package.json').version; L33: const versionMod = require('../lib/version'); ... L39: const msg = err && err.stack || err && err.message || String(err); L40: try { process.stderr.write(`\n[emp: uncaught] ${msg}\n`); } catch {} L41:

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

bin/emp.jsView on unpkg · L4

7if (require('fs').existsSync(exePath)) { L8: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L9: const child = spawn(exePath, process.argv.slice(2), { stdio: 'inherit' });

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/emp.jsView on unpkg · L7

4try { L5: const exeName = process.platform === 'win32' ? 'emp-win.exe' : process.platform === 'darwin' ? 'emp-macos' : 'emp-linux'; L6: const exePath = require('path').join(__dirname, '..', 'dist', exeName); L7: if (require('fs').existsSync(exePath)) { L8: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L9: const child = spawn(exePath, process.argv.slice(2), { stdio: 'inherit' }); ... L31: L32: const VERSION = require('../package.json').version; L33: const versionMod = require('../lib/version'); ... L39: const msg = err && err.stack || err && err.message || String(err); L40: try { process.stderr.write(`\n[emp: uncaught] ${msg}\n`); } catch {} L41:

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

bin/emp.jsView on unpkg · L4

7if (require('fs').existsSync(exePath)) { L8: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L9: const child = spawn(exePath, process.argv.slice(2), { stdio: 'inherit' }); ... L1037: if (!id) { console.log(' cancelled'); return defaultId; } L1038: const baseUrl = (await lifecycle.ask(' baseUrl (e.g. https://api.example.com): ')).trim(); L1039: if (!/^https?:\/\//i.test(baseUrl)) { console.log(C.red + ' baseUrl must start with http(s)://' + C.r); return defaultId; } ... L1673: const schemas = tools.getSchemas(); L1674: console.log('Available tools:'); L1675: for (const t of schemas) { ... L1887: if (!fs.existsSync(abs)) { console.log(`File not found: ${abs}`); return; } L1888: const data = fs.readFileSync(abs); L1889: if (data.length > 8*1024*1024) { console.log(`Image too large ${(data.

High

Remote Agent Bridge

Source exposes local file and command tools to a remote model endpoint.

bin/emp.jsView on unpkg · L7

4Detached bundled service listener: bin/emp.js spawns emp-web/dist/server.cjs; helper exposes a broad-bound HTTP listener. L4: try { L5: const exeName = process.platform === 'win32' ? 'emp-win.exe' : process.platform === 'darwin' ? 'emp-macos' : 'emp-linux'; L6: const exePath = require('path').join(__dirname, '..', 'dist', exeName); L7: if (require('fs').existsSync(exePath)) { L8: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L9: const child = spawn(exePath, process.argv.slice(2), { stdio: 'inherit' }); ... L31: L32: const VERSION = require('../package.json').version; L33: const versionMod = require('../lib/version'); ... L39: const msg = err && err.stack || err && err.message || String(err); L40: try { process.stderr.write(`\n[emp: uncaught] ${msg}\n`); } catch {} L41:

High

Spawned Bundled Service Listener

Source launches a detached bundled service that exposes a broad-bound HTTP listener.

bin/emp.jsView on unpkg · L4

4Trigger-reachable persistence chain: scripts.start -> bin/emp.js L4: try { L5: const exeName = process.platform === 'win32' ? 'emp-win.exe' : process.platform === 'darwin' ? 'emp-macos' : 'emp-linux'; L6: const exePath = require('path').join(__dirname, '..', 'dist', exeName); L7: if (require('fs').existsSync(exePath)) { L8: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L9: const child = spawn(exePath, process.argv.slice(2), { stdio: 'inherit' }); ... L31: L32: const VERSION = require('../package.json').version; L33: const versionMod = require('../lib/version'); ... L39: const msg = err && err.stack || err && err.message || String(err); L40: try { process.stderr.write(`\n[emp: uncaught] ${msg}\n`); } catch {} L41:

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

bin/emp.jsView on unpkg · L4

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 3

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

bin/emp.jsView on unpkg

5const exeName = process.platform === 'win32' ? 'emp-win.exe' : process.platform === 'darwin' ? 'emp-macos' : 'emp-linux'; L6: const exePath = require('path').join(__dirname, '..', 'dist', exeName); L7: if (require('fs').existsSync(exePath)) {

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bin/emp.jsView on unpkg · L5

lib/tools.jsView file

4const path = require('path'); L5: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L6: const bg = require('./bg'); L7: let workspace; L8: try { workspace = require('./workspace'); } catch { workspace = { getWorkspace: () => process.cwd() }; } L9: ... L15: L16: function unrestricted() { return process.env.EMP_UNRESTRICTED === '1'; } L17: ... L62: function hasUnresolvedShortName(abs) { L63: if (process.platform !== 'win32') return false; L64: return String(abs || '').split(/[\\/]+/).some((seg) => /~\d+$/.test(seg));

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

lib/tools.jsView on unpkg · L4

296L297: const OBFUSCATED_COMMAND_RE = /(?:base64\s+(?:-d|--decode|-D)[\s\S]*\|[\s\S]*\b(?:sh|bash|zsh|dash|powershell|pwsh|cmd)\b|\b(?:sh|bash|zsh|dash)\b[^\n|]*<<<|powershell[^\n]*\s-(?:e... L298:

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

lib/tools.jsView on unpkg · L296

install.shView file

•path = install.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 1217 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

install.shView on unpkg

Lines 276-316javascript

276 if (base) {

277 alts.push(String.raw`users[\\/]` + base + String.raw`[\\/]` + special);

278 alts.push(String.raw`home[\\/]` + base + String.raw`[\\/]` + special);

279 }

280 return new RegExp('(?:' + alts.join('|') + ')', 'i');

281})();

282

283const EXPANDED_USER_DIR_RE = (() => {

284 const dirs = [];

285 const home = process.platform === 'win32' ? (process.env.USERPROFILE || '') : (process.env.HOME || '');

286 if (home) {

287 for (const n of ['', 'Desktop', 'Documents', 'Downloads', 'Pictures', 'Music', 'Videos', 'OneDrive']) {

288 const full = n ? path.join(home, n) : home;

289 for (const v of pathVariantsOf(full)) dirs.push(v.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&'));

290 }

291 }

292 if (!dirs.length) return null;

293 dirs.sort((a, b) => b.length - a.length);

294 return new RegExp('(?:' + dirs.join('|') + `)(?:["'\\s;&|)]|[\\\\/]\\s*\\*|[\\\\/]?\\s*$|\\\\?\\s*$)`, 'i'

295})();

296

297const OBFUSCATED_COMMAND_RE = /(?:base64\s+(?:-d|--decode|-D)[\s\S]*\|[\s\S]*\b(?:sh|bash|zsh|dash|powershell|pwsh|cmd)\b|\b(?:sh|bash|zsh|dash)\b[^\n|]*<<<|

298

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

lib/tools.jsView on unpkg · L296

299const INLINE_INTERPRETER_RE = /(?:^|[\s;&|(])(?:node|nodejs|deno|bun|python[\d.]*|py|python3|perl|ruby|php|lua|Rscript|osascript|powershell(?:\.exe)?|pwsh|wscript|cscript|mshta)

300

301const DESTRUCTIVE_FS_API_RE = new RegExp([

302 String.raw`\.\s*(?:rmSync|rmdirSync|unlinkSync|truncateSync|rm|rmdir|unlink|truncate)\s*\(`,

303 String.raw`\brmSync\b|\brmdirSync\b|\bunlinkSync\b`,

304 String.raw`shutil\s*\.\s*(?:rmtree|move)`,

305 String.raw`os\s*\.\s*(?:remove|unlink|rmdir|removedirs|truncate)\b`,

306 String.raw`pathlib[^\n]*\.unlink`,

307 String.raw`Path\s*\([^\n]*\)\s*\.\s*unlink`,

308 String.raw`File\.Delete|Directory\.Delete|File\.WriteAllText`,

309 String.raw`FileUtils\.rm_rf|FileUtils\.rm\b`,

310 String.raw`Remove-Item|Clear-Content|Clear-Item|Remove-ItemProperty`,

311 String.raw`Set-Content\s+[^\n]*-Value\s*''`,

312 String.raw`\bunlink\s*\(`,

313 String.raw`\brmtree\b`,

314 String.raw`fs::remove_(?:file|dir_all)`,

315 String.raw`os\.RemoveAll|os\.Remove\b`,

316 String.raw`recursive\s*:\s*true`,