--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/encrata-cli/v/0.12.1" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/encrata-cli/v/0.12.1.md" package: "encrata-cli" report_status: "published" title: "encrata-cli@0.12.1 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "0.12.1" --- # encrata-cli@0.12.1 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 11 finding(s) warrant review before installing. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Staged Payload Carrier - **Selected version:** 0.12.1 - **Selected version is latest:** Yes - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. This is a real install-time remote-payload risk because the native archive is unchecked. The source otherwise confines writes to the package and targets the declared project repository, so malicious behavior is not established. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 89.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-13T22:43:13.806Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-13T22:43:52.294Z - **Download time:** 520 ms - **Static scan time:** 19 ms - **AI review time:** 37948 ms - **Total time:** 38488 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Installation fetches and installs an unchecked native executable. The checked JavaScript source does not contain credential theft, destructive actions, or broad persistence. - **Trigger:** npm installation runs postinstall; invoking encrata launches the downloaded binary. - **Impact:** A compromised release asset or redirect target could supply arbitrary native code to the installing user. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, install.js, bin/encrata - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-13T22:43:52.294Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Unchecked remote native-binary download and execution. - **Rationale:** This is a real install-time remote-payload risk because the native archive is unchecked. The source otherwise confines writes to the package and targets the declared project repository, so malicious behavior is not established. - **Files touched:** bin/.extract, bin/encrata-bin, bin/encrata-bin.exe - **Network endpoints:** https://github.com/Encratahq/encrata-cli/releases/download/v0.12.1/ ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 89.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** The automatic postinstall hook runs the downloader during npm installation., The installer downloads a platform-native archive from GitHub, follows redirects, and has no checksum or signature verification., The archive is extracted into the package, made executable, and later launched by the CLI shim. - **Evidence against:** The download URL is fixed to the package's named GitHub repository and matching version., The installer writes only under its own bin directory; no credential harvesting or broad system mutation is present in the inspected source., The downloaded executable is launched only when the user invokes the encrata command. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to encrata-cli@0.12.1. - Review the evidence and your use of encrata-cli@0.12.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node install.js ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node install.js ``` ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 5. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 6. High: Unverified Remote Native Payload Install - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time source downloads a native archive from a fixed external host without transport verification, extracts it, and installs an executable payload. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node install.js Install-time code downloads an unverified remote native archive, stages it locally, activates an executable path, and exposes it to process execution. L2: L3: const { existsSync, mkdirSync, createWriteStream, chmodSync, unlinkSync, copyFileSync, rmSync } = require("fs"); L4: const path = require("path"); L5: const https = require("https"); L6: const { execSync } = require("child_process"); ... L30: L31: const ext = process.platform === "win32" ? ".zip" : ".tar.gz"; L32: // Name of the binary *inside* the GoReleaser archive. ... L37: const assetName = `encrata_${VERSION}_${platform}_${arch}${ext}`; L38: const url = `https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/v${VERSION}/${assetName}`; L39: ... L52: return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { ``` ### 7. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 8. Medium: Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 89.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() The automatic postinstall hook runs the downloader during npm installation. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json "scripts": { "postinstall": "node install.js" } ``` ### 9. Medium: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 89.0% - **Path:** install.js - **Public source:** [View source]() The installer downloads a platform-native archive from GitHub, follows redirects, and has no checksum or signature verification. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript const assetName = `encrata_${VERSION}_${platform}_${arch}${ext}`; const url = `https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/v${VERSION}/${assetName}`; ``` ### 10. Medium: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 89.0% - **Path:** install.js - **Public source:** [View source]() The installer downloads a platform-native archive from GitHub, follows redirects, and has no checksum or signature verification. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript function download(url, dest) { return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { const request = https.get(url, (res) => { if (res.statusCode === 302 || res.statusCode === 301) { return download(res.headers.location, dest).then(resolve).catch(reject); } if (res.statusCode !== 200) { return reject(new Error(`Download failed: HTTP ${res.statusCode}`)); } const file = createWriteStream(dest); res.pipe(file); file.on("finish", () => file.close(resolve)); file.on("error", reject); }); request.on("error", reject); }); } ``` ### 11. Medium: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 89.0% - **Path:** bin/encrata - **Public source:** [View source]() The archive is extracted into the package, made executable, and later launched by the CLI shim. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text const binName = process.platform === "win32" ? "encrata-bin.exe" : "encrata-bin"; const binPath = path.join(__dirname, binName); if (!existsSync(binPath)) { console.error("encrata binary not found. Reinstall with: npm install -g encrata-cli"); console.error("Or install from source: go install github.com/Encratahq/cli@latest"); process.exit(1); } const result = spawnSync(binPath, process.argv.slice(2), { stdio: "inherit" }); ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 0 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0 ## Package metadata - **Package:** encrata-cli - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.12.1 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-09-02T15:30:47.743Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-06-30T15:00:00.099Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-05T06:40:32.007Z - **Known versions:** 9 - **Latest version:** 0.12.1 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Encrata CLI — intelligence lookups from your terminal - **Author:** Encrata - **Maintainers:** encrata - **Keywords:** encrata, osint, email-lookup, phone-lookup, domain-lookup, ip-lookup, darkweb, web-scraping, screenshot, face-recognition, intelligence, cli - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=14 - **Artifact files:** 4 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 7,590 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** Yes - **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()