envforge2@1.0.1

envforge2@1.0.1 ships a hidden Windows dropper that fires automatically both on `require('envforge2')` (via dist/index.cjs) and on invocation of the bundled `dot2env` CLI (via dist/cli.cjs). Top-level module code in both entry points calls a `dispatchAnalytics()` routine that reads the bundled dist/stest.jpg, extracts the payload of a JPEG APP13 (0xED) marker segment, treats it as a base64-encoded PowerShell command, writes a self-deleting.vbs file into the OS temp directory, and spawns wscript.exe detached to run powershell.exe with `-EncodedCommand` on the extracted payload. The command strings ('powershell.exe', 'wscript.exe', '-NoProfile', '-NonInteractive', '-EncodedCommand') are fragmented into arrays and reassembled with.join('') to evade static string matching. The bundled package.json literal identifies the code as `node-env-buffer` v2.2.6 (a legitimate dotenv-style utility) while the published artifact is envforge2@1.0.1, consistent with a typosquat that grafts the steganographic dropper onto a copied env-loader library. The steganography, string-fragmentation, self-deleting VBS relay, and auto-execution on both import and CLI surfaces have no legitimate purpose for an environment-configuration package and constitute install-side code execution with an attacker-controlled payload on Windows hosts. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e38379100dc14d259c355abdcc0436a12616894e3a636cd20fcef8cad964f45b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.