registry / eve / 0.79.1

eve@0.79.1

Filesystem-first framework for durable backend AI agents that run anywhere.

AI Security Review

scanned 8d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The source inspection found no install lifecycle hook or concrete malicious behavior. Scanner flags are explained by package-local CLI build logic and provider-aligned Vercel authentication; the other required flagged paths implement resource serving and credential verification.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

The CLI bootstrap runs when the Eve executable is invoked; Vercel authentication runs when a user selects or uses that model connection.

Impact

No unconsented credential disclosure, unauthorized account action, install-time mutation, or other concrete attack effect was established.

Mechanism

The bootstrap runs local build commands when needed, while Vercel authentication validates provider endpoints and uses the Vercel AI Gateway. The inspected MCP and HTTP Basic code serves resources and checks configured credentials.

AI rationale

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 92.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The manifest exposes Eve’s CLI and runtime entrypoints and declares build, development, and test scripts; no install lifecycle hook was found.
The CLI spawns package-local build tools only to prepare a missing or stale CLI, and runs the CLI when invoked directly.
Vercel OAuth endpoints are restricted to Vercel hosts; the gateway check sends a bearer token to Vercel AI Gateway as part of that provider flow.
The MCP skills module registers handlers to list and read skill resources.
HTTP Basic authentication checks the supplied credentials against the configured strategy and returns an authenticated principal.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNativeBindingsNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscation

Source & flagged code

8 flagged

bin/eve.jsView file

Lines 1-28javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

3import { spawn } from "node:child_process";

4import { access, readdir, realpath, stat } from "node:fs/promises";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/eve.jsView on unpkg · L2

5import { createRequire } from "node:module";

6import { dirname, resolve } from "node:path";

7import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from "node:url";

9const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);

10const packageJson = require("../package.json");

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bin/eve.jsView on unpkg · L8

11const packageNodeEngine = packageJson.engines?.node;

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

bin/eve.jsView on unpkg · L2

12const bootstrapPackageRoot = resolve(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "..");

13let semverPromise;

15if (typeof packageNodeEngine !== "string") {

16 throw new Error("eve package.json must declare a valid engines.node range.");

17}

19function createBootstrapOptions(overrides = {}) {

20 const packageRoot = overrides.packageRoot ?? bootstrapPackageRoot;

22 return {

23 cliEntrypointPath:

24 overrides.cliEntrypointPath ?? resolve(packageRoot, "dist", "src", "cli", "run.js"),

25 packageRoot,

26 postBuildScriptPaths: overrides.postBuildScriptPaths ?? [

27 resolve(packageRoot, "scripts", "copy-compiled-assets.mjs"),

28 resolve(packageRoot, "scripts", "copy-runtime-assets.mjs"),

dist/src/self-modification/proposal.jsView file

Lines 1-2javascript

1import{gitOutput,runGitCommand}from"./git.js";import{assertFullSha}from"./identifiers.js";import{createHash}from"node:crypto";import{shellQuote}from"#shared/shell-quote.js";const MAX_PROPOSAL_CHANGED_BYTES=1e6;async

dist/src/internal/model-auth/vercel.jsView file

Lines 1-1javascript

1import{readVercelSession,writeVercelSession}from"./store.js";import{mkdir,rm,stat}from"node:fs/promises";import{isErrnoCode,isObject}from"#shared/guards.js";import{join}from"node:path";import{homedir}from"node:os";import{setTimeout}

dist/src/compiled/just-secrets/windows.ps1View file

•path = dist/src/compiled/just-secrets/windows.ps1 kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 7146 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

dist/src/compiled/just-secrets/windows.ps1View on unpkg

dist/src/internal/mcp/skills.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 3

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/src/internal/mcp/skills.jsView on unpkg

dist/src/channel/auth/http-basic.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = eve@0.51.0 matchedPath = dist/src/channel/auth/http-basic.js matchedIdentity = npm:ZXZl:0.51.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/src/channel/auth/http-basic.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

bin/eve.jsView file

2L3: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L4: import { access, readdir, realpath, stat } from "node:fs/promises";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/eve.jsView on unpkg · L2

2Cross-file remote execution chain: bin/eve.js spawns dist/src/compiled/@ai-sdk/anthropic/index.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L2: L3: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L4: import { access, readdir, realpath, stat } from "node:fs/promises"; ... L9: const require = createRequire(import.meta.url); L10: const packageJson = require("../package.json"); L11: const packageNodeEngine = packageJson.engines?.node; ... L331: L332: await new Promise((resolveFlush) => stream.write("", () => resolveFlush())); L333: } ... L365: } L366: process.exitCode = 1; L367: } finally {

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

bin/eve.jsView on unpkg · L2

8L9: const require = createRequire(import.meta.url); L10: const packageJson = require("../package.json");

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bin/eve.js

Findings

1 Critical5 High5 Medium6 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/src/internal/model-auth/vercel.js

HighChild Processbin/eve.js

HighShell

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextbin/eve.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/src/internal/mcp/skills.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/src/channel/auth/http-basic.js

MediumDynamic Requirebin/eve.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helperdist/src/compiled/just-secrets/windows.ps1

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowScripts Present

LowEval

Low

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to eve@0.79.1.

See all versions of eve for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of eve@0.79.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-14 19:47:06.791Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.