The npm postinstall path does not install the Codex hook, so this is not an unconsented install-time control-surface hijack. The guarded risk is the explicit ec start path, which can still rewrite machine-wide Codex hook policy after UAC when a Codex agent is in use.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
User runs ec start or restart on Windows with a Codex agent configured, or a global npm install on Linux.
Impact
Codex tool calls owned by EvolCore can be denied by the local daemon, and machine-wide managed-hook settings are changed. Standalone Codex sessions without the session token are left allowed.
Mechanism
The start path elevates the bundled installer, which sets allow_managed_hooks_only and a PreToolUse command pointing at the package hook. The hook enforces policy only for processes that already carry the EvolCore session token.
Evidence
package.jsonbin/install-codex-managed-hooks.mjsdist/cli/daemon-commands.jsdist/agents/codex/diagnostics.jsbin/codex-managed-hook.mjs/etc/codexProgramData/OpenAI/Codex/requirements.tomlProgramData/OpenAI/Codex/EvolCore/hooks/pre-tool-use.mjs