---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/explainmyrepo/v/0.9.0"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/explainmyrepo/v/0.9.0.md"
package: "explainmyrepo"
report_status: "published"
title: "explainmyrepo@0.9.0 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.9.0"
---

# explainmyrepo@0.9.0 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as AI-agent capability risk** — Allowed by default with warning: agent-facing configuration or capability changes need review before use.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only AI-agent capability risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** AI-agent capability abuse
- **Selected version:** 0.9.0
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

This is a real, unresolved AI-agent capability risk, but it is not an automatic install-time attack and no hardcoded exfiltration receiver was found. Downgrade to a warning rather than block publication.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 91.0%
- **Started:** 2026-09-19T19:30:43.150Z
- **Finished:** 2026-09-19T19:31:51.701Z
- **Download time:** 504 ms
- **Static scan time:** 936 ms
- **AI review time:** 67109 ms
- **Total time:** 68551 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** An explicitly run hosted runner gives a prompt-injected agent unrestricted shell capability while API credentials are present. A malicious submitted repository could direct that agent to misuse those credentials.

- **Trigger:** An operator runs bin/agentic-runner.mjs against an untrusted repository.

- **Impact:** Conditional exposure or misuse of Anthropic, OpenAI, or Netlify credentials.

- **Evidence paths:** bin/agentic-runner.mjs

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-09-19T19:31:51.701Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** A bypass-permissions AI agent receives Bash access and service credentials.

- **Rationale:** This is a real, unresolved AI-agent capability risk, but it is not an automatic install-time attack and no hardcoded exfiltration receiver was found. Downgrade to a warning rather than block publication.

- **Files touched:** bin/agentic-runner.mjs

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 91.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for warning:** The packaged hosted runner processes an untrusted submitted repository with an agent whose permission checks are bypassed., That runner gives the agent Bash access and forwards Anthropic, OpenAI, and Netlify credentials into its environment., The normal npm manifest has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook, so this capability is not activated on installation.

- **Evidence against:** The risky runner is not the declared npm bin entrypoint., The main CLI’s API clients send credentials to their corresponding service endpoints rather than to an operator-configurable receiver.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to explainmyrepo@0.9.0.

- Review the evidence and your use of explainmyrepo@0.9.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 2. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** tools/make-pack.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/explainmyrepo@0.9.0/tools/make-pack.mjs>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L24: 
L25: import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
L26: import fs from 'node:fs';
```

### 3. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** kb/dep-graph.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/explainmyrepo@0.9.0/kb/dep-graph.mjs>)

Package source references shell execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L94: const abs = path.join(repoDir, r);
L95: // componentRoots can be AI-authored (kb:register) and may name a FILE (execa's "index.js"
L96: // crashed readdirSync here, run 28666874765) — only directories are scannable roots.
```

### 4. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** kb/resolve-deps.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/explainmyrepo@0.9.0/kb/resolve-deps.mjs>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L23: 
L24: // require() rooted at THIS file — node walks up node_modules from kb/ to the project root,
L25: // so it finds deps installed either in kb/node_modules or the project root node_modules.
```

### 5. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 6. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 7. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 8. High: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** tools/clone-repo.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/explainmyrepo@0.9.0/tools/clone-repo.mjs>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L44: if (!owner || !name) return null;
L45: return { host: u.host, owner, name, cloneUrl: `https://${u.host}/${owner}/${name}.git` };
L46: }
...
L50: try {
L51: const out = execFileSync('git', args, {
L52: env: { ...process.env, GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT: '0' },   // never block on an interactive prompt
L53: // Run from a NEUTRAL directory: if this tool is invoked from inside a git checkout (e.g. the
```

### 9. Critical: Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** bin/agentic-runner.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/explainmyrepo@0.9.0/bin/agentic-runner.mjs>)

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination.
L16: //   - Streams --output-format stream-json so tool calls are visible AS THEY HAPPEN (real progress,
L17: //     not a fixed step counter) — printed to stderr and, if --build-id/--gist-id are set, patched to
L18: //     the status gist so the website's poll shows the agent's actual current action.
...
L25: 
L26: import { spawn, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
L27: import fs from 'node:fs';
...
L50: // (Learned live 2026-07-08: the first INV-21 preflight failed CLOSED on exactly this — safe, but wrong.)
L51: if (!/^[a-z]+:\/\//i.test(repoUrl) && !/github\.com/i.test(repoUrl)) repoUrl = `https://github.com/${repoUrl.replace(/^\/+/, '')}`;
L52: 
...
L82: 
L83: function log(msg) { process.stderr.write(`[ag
```

### 10. Critical: Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** tools/deploy.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/explainmyrepo@0.9.0/tools/deploy.mjs>)

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L13: //                             publish.graderUnavailable
L14: //   stdout = ONE JSON result object; diagnostics → stderr; exit 0 iff ok:true, else non-zero.
L15: //
...
L26: import path from 'node:path';
L27: import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
L28: 
...
L37: catch { throw new Error(`build.json not found at ${p} (run earlier stations first)`); }
L38: try { return JSON.parse(raw); }
L39: catch (e) { throw new Error(`build.json is not valid JSON: ${e.message}`); }
...
L49: async function api(url, opts, label) {
L50: const res = await fetch(url, opts);
L51: const text = await res.text();
```

### 11. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 12. Low: Telemetry
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs.

### 13. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 14. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 15. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** src/claude.mjs\#virtual:normalized:round1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/explainmyrepo@0.9.0/src/claude.mjs%23virtual%3Anormalized%3Around1>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 4
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 4
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 4

### Published dependency entries
- @ruvector/rvf ^0.2.2 (Dependency)
- @xenova/transformers ^2.17.2 (Dependency)
- playwright ^1.61.1 (Dependency)
- sharp ^0.35.3 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** explainmyrepo
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.9.0
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-09-17T21:27:57.500Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-09-19T19:31:51.701Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-07T06:28:43.710Z
- **Known versions:** 12
- **Latest version:** 3.0.0
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Turn any GitHub repo into a bespoke, art-directed explainer site — for humans and their AI — in one command.
- **Author:** ISOvision
- **Maintainers:** isovisionai
- **Keywords:** explainer, documentation, github, repo, ai, knowledge-base, static-site, npx
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18
- **Artifact files:** 60
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,297,582 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/explainmyrepo/v/0.9.0>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/stuinfla/Repo-Explainer>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/stuinfla/Repo-Explainer#readme>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/stuinfla/Repo-Explainer/issues>)
