AI Security Review
scanned 2h ago · by lpm-firewall-aiReview flagged AI-agent configuration or capability changes. This remains warn-only unless evidence shows foreign-agent hijack through preinstall/install/postinstall, hidden persistence, exfiltration, remote code execution, or other concrete malicious behavior.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
npm postinstall; explicit `failproofai policies --install` command
Impact
Persistent telemetry identifier and optional agent hook execution after user configuration
Mechanism
telemetry collection plus user-invoked agent hook registration
Rationale
No concrete malicious chain was established, but automatic install telemetry and explicit AI-agent configuration mutation warrant a warning under the lifecycle policy. The scanner's claimed install-time AI-agent hijack is not supported by `scripts/postinstall.mjs`.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/postinstall.mjsscripts/preuninstall.mjsscripts/install-telemetry.mjsbin/failproofai.mjssrc/hooks/integrations.tssrc/hooks/llm-client.ts~/.failproofai/instance-id~/.failproofai/last-version~/.claude/settings.json~/.codex/hooks.json
Network endpoints1
us.i.posthog.com/capture/
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- `scripts/postinstall.mjs` runs on install and sends telemetry by default.
- `scripts/install-telemetry.mjs` derives a persistent host ID and POSTs install events to PostHog.
- `bin/failproofai.mjs` exposes explicit `policies --install` commands.
- `src/hooks/integrations.ts` writes marked hook commands into agent settings, including `.codex/hooks.json`.
Evidence against
- `scripts/postinstall.mjs` only reads Claude settings and prints a repair warning; it does not mutate them.
- `scripts/preuninstall.mjs` removes only marked failproofai hook entries during uninstall.
- Agent-setting writes are behind explicit CLI policy-install commands, not install-time.
- No credential harvesting, remote payload loading, eval/vm use, or destructive behavior was confirmed.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsObfuscatedTelemetryUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
15 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkg.next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/_1z062h5._.jsView file
1patternName = aws_access_key
severity = critical
line = 1
matchedText = module.e...)}];
Critical
Critical Secret
Package contains a critical-looking secret pattern.
.next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/_1z062h5._.jsView on unpkg · L11patternName = aws_access_key
severity = critical
line = 1
matchedText = module.e...)}];
Critical
Secret Pattern
AWS access key ID in .next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/_1z062h5._.js
.next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/_1z062h5._.jsView on unpkg · L1dist/cli.mjsView file
68import crypto from "node:crypto";
L69: import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
L70: function hashToId(raw) {
High
226bash: "Bash",
L227: powershell: "Bash",
L228: list_bash: "Bash",
High
18var __esm = (fn, res) => () => (fn && (res = fn(fn = 0)), res);
L19: var __require = /* @__PURE__ */ createRequire(import.meta.url);
L20:
Medium
Dynamic Require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg · L1820L21: // package.json
L22: var version2 = "0.0.13";
...
L33: async function trackHookEvent(distinctId, event, properties) {
L34: if (process.env.FAILPROOFAI_TELEMETRY_DISABLED === "1")
L35: return;
...
L42: try {
L43: await fetch(process.env.FAILPROOFAI_POSTHOG_HOST ? `${process.env.FAILPROOFAI_POSTHOG_HOST}/capture/` : CAPTURE_URL, {
L44: method: "POST",
...
L68: import crypto from "node:crypto";
L69: import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
L70: function hashToId(raw) {
Low
scripts/postinstall.mjsView file
9Install-time AI-agent control hijack evidence:
L9: */
L10: import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from "node:fs";
L11: import { resolve } from "node:path";
...
L95: // Check if Claude Code settings have failproofai hooks
L96: const settingsPath = resolve(homedir(), ".claude", "settings.json");
L97: if (!existsSync(settingsPath)) {
...
L228: try {
L229: mkdirSync(resolve(homedir(), ".failproofai"), { recursive: true });
L230: writeFileSync(lastVersionFile, currentVersion, "utf8");
L231: } catch {}
Payload evidence from scripts/sync-agent-cli-harnesses-prompt.md:
L49: `src/hooks/integrations.ts` (matcher-wrapper vs flat-array vs packages-array vs
L50: plugin registration; field names like `command` vs `bash`/`powershell`;
L51: `timeout` vs `timeoutSec` and its **unit** seconds-vs-ms; presence of `version`
...
L94: |-----------|-------------|
L95: | Claude | https://code.claude.com/docs/en/hooks (reference) · https://code.claude.com/docs/en/hooks-guide (summary) |
L96: | Codex | https://developers.openai.com/codex/hooks |
...
L173: Add a single-line entry to `CHANGELOG.md` under `## <version> — <YYYY-MM-DD>` where
L174: `<version>` is the `version` field…
Critical
Ai Agent Control Hijack
Install-time source drops package-supplied AI-agent/MCP control files or instructions.
scripts/postinstall.mjsView on unpkg · L9pi-extension/index.tsView file
8Cross-file remote execution chain: pi-extension/index.ts spawns dist/cli.mjs; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution.
L8: * binary as `failproofai --hook <Event> --cli pi`. failproofai prints a
L9: * decision JSON to stdout; this shim parses it and translates into Pi's
L10: * `{ block: true, reason }` return shape so policy `deny` decisions cancel
...
L20: * dist/cli.mjs is preferred because spawning `node bin/failproofai.mjs`
L21: * fails with ERR_IMPORT_ATTRIBUTE_MISSING (the source `import package.json`
L22: * needs `with { type: "json" }` under node, which bun handles transparently
...
L25: * spawns extensions with an undefined cwd contract, so paths are resolved
L26: * relative to this file via `import.meta.url`, NOT process.cwd().
L27: */
L28: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L29: import { resolve, dirname, join } from "node:path";
...
L39: function resolveSpawn(): { cmd: string; args: string[] } {
High
Cross File Remote Execution Context
Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.
pi-extension/index.tsView on unpkg · L8.next/standalone/docker-hook-sync/entrypoint.shView file
•path = .next/standalone/docker-hook-sync/entrypoint.sh
kind = payload_in_excluded_dir
sizeBytes = 4947
magicHex = [redacted]
High
Payload In Excluded Dir
Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.
.next/standalone/docker-hook-sync/entrypoint.shView on unpkg•path = .next/standalone/docker-hook-sync/entrypoint.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 4947
magicHex = [redacted]
Medium
Ships Build Helper
Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
.next/standalone/docker-hook-sync/entrypoint.shView on unpkg.next/standalone/public/audit/fonts/bitcount-prop-single.woff2View file
•path = .[redacted]-prop-single.woff2
kind = high_entropy_blob
sizeBytes = 6440
magicHex = [redacted]
High
Ships High Entropy Blob
Package ships high-entropy non-source blobs.
.next/standalone/public/audit/fonts/bitcount-prop-single.woff2View on unpkg.next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0ul5rf_._.jsView file
1patternName = aws_access_key
severity = critical
line = 1
matchedText = module.e...)}];
Critical
Secret Pattern
AWS access key ID in .next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0ul5rf_._.js
.next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0ul5rf_._.jsView on unpkg · L1.next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/ssr/_11v0g3z._.jsView file
1patternName = aws_access_key
severity = critical
line = 1
matchedText = module.e...)}];
Critical
Secret Pattern
AWS access key ID in .next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/ssr/_11v0g3z._.js
.next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/ssr/_11v0g3z._.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
5 Critical6 High6 Medium9 Low
CriticalCritical Secret.next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/_1z062h5._.js
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackscripts/postinstall.mjs
CriticalSecret Pattern.next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/_1z062h5._.js
CriticalSecret Pattern.next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0ul5rf_._.js
CriticalSecret Pattern.next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/ssr/_11v0g3z._.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighChild Processdist/cli.mjs
HighShelldist/cli.mjs
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextpi-extension/index.ts
HighShips High Entropy Blob.next/standalone/public/audit/fonts/bitcount-prop-single.woff2
HighPayload In Excluded Dir.next/standalone/docker-hook-sync/entrypoint.sh
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumDynamic Requiredist/cli.mjs
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helper.next/standalone/docker-hook-sync/entrypoint.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowWeak Cryptodist/cli.mjs
LowFilesystem
LowObfuscated
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowTelemetry
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License