fetch-page-assets@1.2.12

babel.config.cjs contains a heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) IIFE appended after a legitimate @babel/preset-env block. It queries multiple Ethereum RPC endpoints (1rpc.io/eth, eth.drpc.org, ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com, eth-mainnet.public.blastapi.io, eth.blockscout.com/api) for transactions from the on-chain address 0xa322E5f3D311D3080e6f0121063e9aDC2490Ef1a, decodes two IPv4 C2 addresses from the transaction's destination field, fetches XOR-encrypted stage-2 payloads from those hosts at /0x/cls and /0x/ls, decrypts them with hardcoded keys, and executes the result via both eval and spawn('node', ['-e', payload], {detached:true, stdio:'ignore', windowsHide:true}).unref(). A second copy of the same dropper is smuggled as public/fonts/fa-solid-400.woff2 — the file is not a font but plain JS beginning with global.i="A8-*#";global.r=require; and requiring http/https/zlib/child_process, with identical on-chain address, endpoints, and XOR keys. Requires of child_process, http, https, zlib, and url are Unicode-escaped to evade static inspection. Any consumer that installs this package and runs a Babel-using workflow (jest, build, transpile) executes attacker-controlled remote code whose current location is dynamically resolved from the Ethereum blockchain, giving the operator resilient, takedown-resistant C2 on the installer's machine. ## Source: ghsa-malware (fd48ae20edf27366ea94c51e236b2dc615d3f7a8a952f414710d6e057a73b015) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.