flavor-code@1.3.23

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AI Security Review

scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Source inspection found a feature-rich, user-invoked coding application but no install lifecycle execution, self-dependency chain, covert collection, or default outbound reporting. The optional webhook reporter is disabled by default, so it does not establish malicious behavior.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

A user invokes the CLI or desktop application; incident reporting additionally requires explicit configuration or an environment variable.

Impact

No automatic installation-time or import-time compromise was found.

Mechanism

User-invoked coding-agent runtime with optional configured incident reporting.

AI rationale

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 84.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

No npm install lifecycle hook is declared; the package exposes a desktop entry point and a CLI entry point.
The CLI runs only when its executable is called and launches its bundled main program.
The updater checks for a newer version before explicitly installing a newer global release of the same package.
Incident reporting is disabled by default in both desktop and shared runtime code.
The auxiliary chunk writes usage and audit records locally under the workspace .flavor directory.
The cited Zod file is a normal vendored validation utility.

Evidence against

No preinstall, install, or postinstall hook, runtime self-dependency, or automatic import-time network action was found.
The only outbound incident reporter is disabled by default and requires configuration or an environment variable.
No source evidence showed secret harvesting, covert persistence, destructive behavior, or an unconsented agent-control-surface write.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequire

Source & flagged code

17 flagged

dist/cli-main.jsView file

56// src/update/apply.ts L57: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L58: function npmExecutable(platform = process.platform) {

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/cli-main.jsView on unpkg · L56

dist/desktop/main.jsView file

7402} L7403: if (["powershell", "pwsh"].includes(name)) { L7404: const flag = args.findIndex((arg) => ["-command", "-c"].includes(arg.toLowerCase()));

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/desktop/main.jsView on unpkg · L7402

8880function runShellHandler(descriptor, event, signal) { L8881: return new Promise((resolve42, reject) => { L8882: const env = { ...process.env, ...descriptor.env }; L8883: const invocation = prepareSpawnInvocation(descriptor.command, descriptor.args ?? [], { env }); L8884: const child = spawn(invocation.command, invocation.args, { L8885: env,

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/desktop/main.jsView on unpkg · L8880

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/desktop/main.js: import { readFile as readFile39, stat as stat18, writeFile as writeFile19 } from "fs/promises"; baseURL: z.string().trim().url().max(2048).refine((value) => { baseURL: z2.string().url().optional(), authorizationUrl: z2.string().url().optional(), await handle.writeFile(data2); baseURL: HttpUrlInput, async function runInteractionManifest(manifest, baseUrl, createDriver) { if (!isLoopbackPreviewUrl(baseUrl)) throw new Error("D2C interaction preview must use a loopback HTTP URL");

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/desktop/main.jsView on unpkg

8922if (code !== 0) { L8923: reject(new Error(`Shell hook exited with code ${code}: ${stderr.trim()}`)); L8924: return; ... L8926: try { L8927: resolve42(HookDecisionSchema.parse(JSON.parse(stdout))); L8928: } catch (error) { ... L8931: }); L8932: child.stdin.end(JSON.stringify(event)); L8933: }); ... L8937: if (process.platform === "win32") { L8938: const killer = spawn("taskkill", ["/pid", String(child.pid), "/t", "/f"], { L8939: stdio: "ignore",

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/desktop/main.jsView on unpkg · L8922

8922Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/desktop/main.js L8922: if (code !== 0) { L8923: reject(new Error(`Shell hook exited with code ${code}: ${stderr.trim()}`)); L8924: return; ... L8926: try { L8927: resolve42(HookDecisionSchema.parse(JSON.parse(stdout))); L8928: } catch (error) { ... L8931: }); L8932: child.stdin.end(JSON.stringify(event)); L8933: }); ... L8937: if (process.platform === "win32") { L8938: const killer = spawn("taskkill", ["/pid", String(child.pid), "/t", "/f"], { L8939: stdio: "ignore",

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/desktop/main.jsView on unpkg · L8922

4import { readFile as readFile39, stat as stat18, writeFile as writeFile19 } from "fs/promises"; L5: import { basename as basename11, dirname as dirname25, join as join48, resolve as resolve41 } from "path"; L6: import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath4 } from "url"; ... L46: try { L47: parsed = JSON.parse(unfenced); L48: } catch { ... L409: } L410: return { ...input, data: data2 }; L411: } ... L1141: const onRenderProcessGone = (_event, details) => { L1142: recordRendererDiagnostic(`renderer process ${details.reason} (exit ${details.exitCode})`); L1143: };

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

dist/desktop/main.jsView on unpkg · L4

dist/astgraph/vendor/tree-sitter.jsView file

2977var func = `(${args}) => { ${body} };`; L2978: ASM_CONSTS[start] = eval(func); L2979: }

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/astgraph/vendor/tree-sitter.jsView on unpkg · L2977

dist/astgraph/index.jsView file

29async function mod(name) { L30: return import(new URL(`./${name}`, import.meta.url).href); L31: }

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/astgraph/index.jsView on unpkg · L29

dist/desktop/plugin-worker-entry.jsView file

28const signal = Object.freeze({ aborted: false, reason: undefined, addEventListener() {}, removeEventListener() {}, throwIfAborted() {} }); L29: const cloneJson = (value) => value === undefined ? undefined : JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(value)); L30: const deepFreeze = (value) => {

Medium

Unsafe Vm Context

Package source executes code through a VM context API.

dist/desktop/plugin-worker-entry.jsView on unpkg · L28

dist/cli.jsView file

11Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/cli.js spawns dist/desktop/main.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L11: // src/launcher.ts L12: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L13: import { realpathSync, readFileSync } from "fs"; ... L50: try { L51: marker = parseMemoryRestartMarker(readFileSync(memoryRestartMarkerPath(process.cwd()), "utf8")); L52: } catch { ... L56: if (resumed !== void 0) { L57: process.stderr.write(`flavor launcher: heap watermark restart, resuming session ${marker.sessionId} L58: `);

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L11

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = flavor-code@1.3.17 matchedPath = dist/cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:Zmxhdm9yLWNvZGU:1.3.17 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

dist/astgraph/vendor/tree-sitter.wasmView file

•path = dist/astgraph/vendor/tree-sitter.wasm kind = wasm_module sizeBytes = 205488 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Wasm Module

Package ships WebAssembly modules.

dist/astgraph/vendor/tree-sitter.wasmView on unpkg

dist/astgraph/vendor/zod/v4/core/util.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/astgraph/vendor/zod/v4/core/util.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

dist/chunk-Z62P4LL7.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = flavor-code@1.4.1 matchedIdentity = npm:Zmxhdm9yLWNvZGU:1.4.1 similarity = 0.478 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/chunk-Z62P4LL7.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = flavor-code@1.3.17 matchedPath = dist/chunk-BKOOYSGH.js matchedIdentity = npm:Zmxhdm9yLWNvZGU:1.3.17 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/chunk-Z62P4LL7.jsView on unpkg

dist/chunk-RQTYHUMK.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = flavor-code@1.3.17 matchedPath = dist/chunk-RQTYHUMK.js matchedIdentity = npm:Zmxhdm9yLWNvZGU:1.3.17 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/chunk-RQTYHUMK.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

17 flagged · loading source

dist/cli-main.jsView file

56// src/update/apply.ts L57: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L58: function npmExecutable(platform = process.platform) {

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/cli-main.jsView on unpkg · L56

dist/desktop/main.jsView file

7402} L7403: if (["powershell", "pwsh"].includes(name)) { L7404: const flag = args.findIndex((arg) => ["-command", "-c"].includes(arg.toLowerCase()));

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/desktop/main.jsView on unpkg · L7402

High

Same File Env Network Execution

Findings

1 Critical11 High6 Medium7 Low

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/chunk-Z62P4LL7.js

HighChild Processdist/cli-main.js

HighShelldist/desktop/main.js

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/desktop/main.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/desktop/main.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/desktop/main.js

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/cli.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/desktop/main.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/astgraph/vendor/zod/v4/core/util.js#virtual:normalized:round1

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/chunk-Z62P4LL7.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similarity

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to flavor-code@1.3.23.

See all versions of flavor-code for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of flavor-code@1.3.23 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-13 22:35:54.423Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.