registry / flavor-code / 1.4.2
flavor-code@1.4.2
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AI Security Review
scanned 15d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection did not confirm the scanner's credential-forwarding, command-output exfiltration, or agent-control claims. The reviewed excerpts show normal application behavior and no concrete attack chain.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
No malicious trigger was established; the inspected code is reached through normal application or CLI use.
Impact
No malicious impact was established from the inspected source.
Mechanism
The inspected excerpts show provider request headers, process execution support, and workspace instruction filename handling without evidence of unrelated credential forwarding, exfiltration, or unconsented control-surface writes.
AI rationale
Source inspection did not confirm the scanner's credential-forwarding, command-output exfiltration, or agent-control claims. The reviewed excerpts show normal application behavior and no concrete attack chain.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 78.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook; its listed build script is a development command.
- The flagged chunk lists project instruction filenames as data; the excerpt does not show a write or configuration mutation.
- The desktop bundle lists instruction filenames and defines a workspace instruction reader; the cited excerpt does not establish foreign agent configuration changes.
- The CLI main entrypoint imports package-local RPC and tracing modules.
- The CLI launcher uses child-process support, but that alone does not establish harmful execution.
- The added chunk's excerpt shows debug-gated error logging and a usage-file path, not network transmission.
- Provider API keys are placed in request headers for provider requests; the excerpt does not show forwarding to an unrelated fixed recipient.
- The desktop helper runs a named executable with argument arrays; this excerpt does not establish command-output exfiltration.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
11 flagged · loading sourcedist/cli-main.jsView file
59// src/update/apply.ts
L60: import { spawn } from "child_process";
L61: function npmExecutable(platform = process.platform) {
High
dist/desktop/main.jsView file
7657}
L7658: if (["powershell", "pwsh"].includes(name)) {
L7659: const flag = args.findIndex((arg) => ["-command", "-c"].includes(arg.toLowerCase()));
High
9213function runShellHandler(descriptor, event, signal) {
L9214: return new Promise((resolve44, reject) => {
L9215: const env = { ...process.env, ...descriptor.env };
L9216: const invocation = prepareSpawnInvocation(descriptor.command, descriptor.args ?? [], { env });
L9217: const child = spawn(invocation.command, invocation.args, {
L9218: env,
High
Same File Env Network Execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
dist/desktop/main.jsView on unpkg · L9213•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/desktop/main.js:
import { readFile as readFile41, stat as stat20, writeFile as writeFile19 } from "fs/promises";
baseURL: z.string().trim().url().max(2048).refine((value) => {
baseURL: z2.string().url().optional(),
authorizationUrl: z2.string().url().optional(),
await handle.writeFile(data2);
baseURL: HttpUrlInput,
async function runInteractionManifest(manifest, baseUrl, createDriver) {
if (!isLoopbackPreviewUrl(baseUrl)) throw new Error("D2C interaction preview must use a loopback HTTP URL");
High
Credential Redirect Persistence
Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.
dist/desktop/main.jsView on unpkg9255if (code !== 0) {
L9256: reject(new Error(`Shell hook exited with code ${code}: ${stderr.trim()}`));
L9257: return;
...
L9259: try {
L9260: resolve44(HookDecisionSchema.parse(JSON.parse(stdout)));
L9261: } catch (error) {
...
L9264: });
L9265: child.stdin.end(JSON.stringify(event));
L9266: });
...
L9270: if (process.platform === "win32") {
L9271: const killer = spawn("taskkill", ["/pid", String(child.pid), "/t", "/f"], {
L9272: stdio: "ignore",
High
Command Output Exfiltration
Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.
dist/desktop/main.jsView on unpkg · L92559255Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/desktop/main.js
L9255: if (code !== 0) {
L9256: reject(new Error(`Shell hook exited with code ${code}: ${stderr.trim()}`));
L9257: return;
...
L9259: try {
L9260: resolve44(HookDecisionSchema.parse(JSON.parse(stdout)));
L9261: } catch (error) {
...
L9264: });
L9265: child.stdin.end(JSON.stringify(event));
L9266: });
...
L9270: if (process.platform === "win32") {
L9271: const killer = spawn("taskkill", ["/pid", String(child.pid), "/t", "/f"], {
L9272: stdio: "ignore",
High
Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.
dist/desktop/main.jsView on unpkg · L92554import { readFile as readFile41, stat as stat20, writeFile as writeFile19 } from "fs/promises";
L5: import { basename as basename12, dirname as dirname23, join as join51, resolve as resolve43 } from "path";
L6: import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath3 } from "url";
...
L46: try {
L47: parsed = JSON.parse(unfenced);
L48: } catch {
...
L413: }
L414: return { ...input, data: data2 };
L415: }
...
L1145: const onRenderProcessGone = (_event, details) => {
L1146: recordRendererDiagnostic(`renderer process ${details.reason} (exit ${details.exitCode})`);
L1147: };
Low
Weak Crypto
Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
dist/desktop/main.jsView on unpkg · L4dist/desktop/preload.cjsView file
3// src/desktop/preload.ts
L4: var import_electron = require("electron");
L5:
Medium
Dynamic Require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/desktop/preload.cjsView on unpkg · L3dist/desktop/plugin-worker-entry.jsView file
28const signal = Object.freeze({ aborted: false, reason: undefined, addEventListener() {}, removeEventListener() {}, throwIfAborted() {} });
L29: const cloneJson = (value) => value === undefined ? undefined : JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(value));
L30: const deepFreeze = (value) => {
Medium
Unsafe Vm Context
Package source executes code through a VM context API.
dist/desktop/plugin-worker-entry.jsView on unpkg · L28dist/cli.jsView file
11Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/cli.js spawns dist/desktop/main.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution.
L11: // src/launcher.ts
L12: import { spawn } from "child_process";
L13: import { mkdirSync, realpathSync, readFileSync, rmSync } from "fs";
...
L77: for (; ; ) {
L78: const profileDirectory = join(process.cwd(), ".flavor", "tmp");
L79: mkdirSync(profileDirectory, { recursive: true });
...
L85: } else {
L86: process.stderr.write(`flavor launcher: retained allocation profile ${profilePath}
L87: `);
...
L113: stdio: "inherit",
L114: env: { ...process.env, NODE_ENV: "production" }
L115: });
High
Cross File Remote Execution Context
Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L11dist/chunk-B23V72YR.jsView file
•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = flavor-code@1.4.1
matchedIdentity = npm:Zmxhdm9yLWNvZGU:1.4.1
similarity = 0.913
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
Critical
Previous Version Dangerous Delta
This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
dist/chunk-B23V72YR.jsView on unpkgFindings
1 Critical7 High5 Medium6 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/chunk-B23V72YR.js
HighChild Processdist/cli-main.js
HighShelldist/desktop/main.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/desktop/main.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/desktop/main.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/desktop/main.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/cli.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/desktop/main.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/desktop/preload.cjs
MediumUnsafe Vm Contextdist/desktop/plugin-worker-entry.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowWeak Cryptodist/desktop/main.js
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to flavor-code@1.4.2.
See all versions of flavor-code for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of flavor-code@1.4.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.