registry / fluid-type-ui / 2.0.8

fluid-type-ui@2.0.8

Bring fluid type to tailwindcss

AI Security Review

scanned 17d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Requiring src/index.js executes hidden remote-payload logic. It resolves a server address through blockchain data, downloads an obfuscated payload, and evaluates it.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

Any build or runtime action that imports/requires fluid-type-ui.

Impact

Attacker-controlled arbitrary JavaScript execution in the importing user's Node process.

Mechanism

Remote staged payload download, XOR decode, and eval at import time.

Attack narrative

The package’s main entrypoint contains concealed code appended after its legitimate Tailwind plugin export. On import it obtains blockchain transaction data to derive a host, fetches an obfuscated payload from /0x/ls, XOR-decodes it, and evaluates it. This makes remote code execution attacker-controlled and reachable whenever consumers load the package.

Rationale

This is concrete import-time staged remote code execution, not a package-aligned feature. The absence of lifecycle hooks does not mitigate the reachable malicious entrypoint.

Evidence

src/index.jspackage.json

Network endpoints3

1rpc.io/etheth.drpc.orgeth.blockscout.com/api?module=account&action=txlist

OSV Corroboration

OpenSSF/OSV

src/index.js in fluid-type-ui@2.0.8 contains a hidden code block, pushed off-screen by a long run of tab characters, that runs when the module is loaded via require. The block queries Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoints (1rpc.io/eth, eth.drpc.org, eth.blockscout.com) for a transaction from the hardcoded address 0xa322e5f3d311d3080e6f0121063e9adc2490ef1a, extracts two IPv4 addresses embedded in the transaction's `to` field, HTTP-GETs `/0x/ls` from the first, XOR-decrypts the response with a 16-byte key, and passes the decoded bytes to eval with a prelude that binds `global.r=require` and `global.m=module`. The result is arbitrary attacker-controlled code execution on every require of the package, with the command-and-control destination mutable via new on-chain transactions, making takedown resistant. The package is presented as a Tailwind plugin; the EtherHiding-style loader has no relationship to that stated purpose. ## Source: ghsa-malware (8c1e38f40e2f9715d4c44d3b8138a3c9ace6c76af036b59b7f6df86cf09bf2fc) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

fluid-type-ui@2.0.8

AI Security Review

OSV Corroboration

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code