---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/fogoe"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/fogoe/v/1.1.2.md"
package: "fogoe"
report_status: "published"
title: "fogoe@1.1.2 npm security report"
verdict: "policy_finding"
version: "1.1.2"
---

# fogoe@1.1.2 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Blocked: dependency script approvals** — Dependency install scripts may execute with the user's privileges without separate approval.

- **Verdict:** Dependency script approval policy finding
- **Product-default install policy:** Block by default
- **Firewall policy:** Block by default
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Dependency script approval abuse
- **Selected version:** 1.1.2
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This finding concerns install-time expansion of the consumer project's dependency script approvals without explicit informed approval. The published action protects a security boundary; this behavior alone does not establish malicious author intent.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The pnpm fallback automatically enables all dependency build scripts when adding a plugin, bypassing normal approval controls. This is dependency script approval abuse, although it is limited to the explicit plugin-add workflow.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 95.0%
- **Started:** 2026-11-01T04:33:40.564Z
- **Finished:** 2026-11-01T04:34:09.726Z
- **Download time:** 762 ms
- **Static scan time:** 575 ms
- **AI review time:** 27824 ms
- **Total time:** 29162 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** A plugin install fallback enables all dependency build scripts for the pnpm retry.

- **Trigger:** A user runs fogoe add for a plugin, and its pnpm package installation fails.

- **Impact:** Dependency install scripts may execute with the user's privileges without separate approval.

- **Evidence paths:** src/plugins/index.js, src/index.js, package.json

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-11-01T04:34:09.726Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The fallback reruns pnpm add with --config.dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds=true, bypassing normal build-script approval for packages in that installation.

- **Attack narrative:** When a user adds a plugin, Fogoe installs its dependencies. If pnpm fails, Fogoe retries with \`--config.dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds=true\`, automatically allowing dependency build scripts to run. Those scripts can execute code with the user's privileges. The behavior is reachable through the explicit \`fogoe add\` command, but it silently broadens script approval during the retry.

- **Rationale:** The pnpm fallback automatically enables all dependency build scripts when adding a plugin, bypassing normal approval controls. This is dependency script approval abuse, although it is limited to the explicit plugin-add workflow.

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 95.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for block:** When adding a plugin, the code installs its declared packages., If a pnpm install fails, the fallback retries with --config.dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds=true, allowing dependency build scripts to run.

- **Evidence against:** The package has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle script., The flagged install path is triggered by the explicit fogoe add command.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to fogoe@1.1.2.

- Avoid installing fogoe@1.1.2. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version's installer ran, inspect changes to package.json allowScripts and restore the approvals you explicitly reviewed. Check which dependency scripts ran; newly granted approvals do not prove immediate execution or credential theft.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 2. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** src/plugins/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/fogoe@1.1.2/src/plugins/index.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2: const path = require('path');
L3: const { execSync } = require('child_process');
L4: const chalk = require('chalk');
```

### 3. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Package source references shell execution.

### 4. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 5. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 6. High: Runtime Package Install
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 86.0%
- **Path:** src/plugins/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/fogoe@1.1.2/src/plugins/index.js>)

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L69: if (pm === "npm") {
L70: execSync(`npm install --save ${packages}`, { stdio: 'inherit' });
L71: } else if (pm === "bun") {
```

### 7. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 8. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 9. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 10. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** src/plugins/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/fogoe@1.1.2/src/plugins/index.js>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = fogoe@1.0.10
matchedIdentity = npm:Zm9nb2U:1.0.10
similarity = 0.858
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

### 11. High: Suspicious Dependency Evidence
- **Category:** Dependency
- **Confidence:** 95.0%
- **Path:** src/plugins/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/fogoe@1.1.2/src/plugins/index.js>)

If a pnpm install fails, the fallback retries with --config.dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds=true, allowing dependency build scripts to run.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
} else if (pm === "pnpm") {
      try {
        execSync(`pnpm add ${packages}`, { stdio: 'inherit' });
      } catch {
        if (!runInstall(`pnpm add ${packages} --config.dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds=true`)) {
          execSync(`npm install --save ${packages}`, { stdio: 'inherit' });
        }
```

### 12. High: Ai Review Evidence
- **Category:** Ai Review
- **Confidence:** 95.0%
- **Path:** src/plugins/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/fogoe@1.1.2/src/plugins/index.js>)

When adding a plugin, the code installs its declared packages.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
// ── 5. Install packages ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
  // Skip dev type packages when project is JS (no TypeScript)
  const devPkgs = language === 'ts' ? plugin.devPackages : '';
  installPackages(plugin.packages, devPkgs);

  // ── 6. Append env vars ─────────
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 3
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 3

### Published dependency entries
- @clack/prompts ^1.8.1 (Dependency)
- chalk ^4.1.2 (Dependency)
- prompts ^2.4.2 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** fogoe
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 1.1.2
- **License:** Apache-2.0
- **Version published:** 2026-10-16T17:59:59.173Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-10-02T10:03:33.295Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-19T13:11:33.329Z
- **Known versions:** 8
- **Latest version:** 1.3.0
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Open-source CLI for zero-friction Node.js backend initialization with TypeScript support.
- **Author:** Sooriya
- **Keywords:** node, nodejs, cli, backend, scaffold, starter, express, fastify, typescript, developer-tools
- **Artifact files:** 239
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 232,381 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/fogoe/v/1.1.2>)
- [Homepage](<https://sooriya04.github.io/fogoe/>)
