---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/ft-scout/v/8.0.3"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/ft-scout/v/8.0.3.md"
package: "ft-scout"
report_status: "published"
title: "ft-scout@8.0.3 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "8.0.3"
---

# ft-scout@8.0.3 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 24 finding(s) warrant review before installing.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Remote Code Execution
- **Selected version:** 8.0.3
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The dashboard’s unauthenticated status and command endpoints create a concrete remote execution and session exposure risk when the server is reachable. The credential-transfer findings are benign: inspected Firebase credentials go to Firebase’s identity service.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 88.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-22T22:04:16.415Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-22T22:05:00.694Z
- **Download time:** 501 ms
- **Static scan time:** 1238 ms
- **AI review time:** 42539 ms
- **Total time:** 44279 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** The optional dashboard server exposes authentication state and a command endpoint without visible request authentication. Its bind address is unspecified, while the response advertises localhost.

- **Trigger:** A user runs the dashboard command.

- **Impact:** Other devices able to reach the server may obtain session data or trigger local commands.

- **Evidence paths:** bin/src/commands/dashboard.js, bin/src/server/server.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-22T22:05:00.694Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The server permits cross-origin requests, returns saved auth data, and executes CLI commands received by its API.

- **Rationale:** The dashboard’s unauthenticated status and command endpoints create a concrete remote execution and session exposure risk when the server is reachable. The credential-transfer findings are benign: inspected Firebase credentials go to Firebase’s identity service.

- **Files touched:** bin/src/commands/dashboard.js, bin/src/server/server.js

- **Network endpoints:** http://localhost:9120

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 88.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** The dashboard starts when its command handler is invoked and uses port 9120 by default., The server allows cross-origin requests and returns saved authentication state from its status endpoint., The server accepts CLI command requests and passes them to a local process., Firebase login and signup send credentials to the configured Firebase identity service.

- **Evidence against:** The inspected login and signup flows store the Firebase session after authentication; they do not send it to an unrelated recipient., The dashboard is an explicit command, rather than an install-time action.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to ft-scout@8.0.3.

- Review the evidence and your use of ft-scout@8.0.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 2. High: High Secret
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** bin/src/utils/firebaseAuth.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ft-scout@8.0.3/bin/src/utils/firebaseAuth.js>)

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 1
```

### 3. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** bin/src/server/server.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ft-scout@8.0.3/bin/src/server/server.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L3: import path from 'path';
L4: import { exec } from 'child_process';
L5: import { fileURLToPath } from 'url';
```

### 4. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** bin/src/commands/agent.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ft-scout@8.0.3/bin/src/commands/agent.js>)

Package source references shell execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L18: import { promisify } from 'util';
L19: const execAsync = promisify(exec);
L20: const FT_DIR = path.join(process.cwd(), '.ft', 'scout');
```

### 5. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 6. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 7. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 8. Critical: Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** bin/src/utils/email.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ft-scout@8.0.3/bin/src/utils/email.js>)

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L5: import { FIREBASE_API_KEY, FIREBASE_TENANT_ID } from './firebaseAuth.js';
L6: const cwdEnv = path.resolve(process.cwd(), '.env');
L7: if (fs.existsSync(cwdEnv)) {
...
L80: </ul>
L81: <p>For more commands refer <a href="https://frontterrain.com/ft-scout">here</a></p><br>
L82: <p>Have any suggestion, feedback or need assistance we\'re always here on <a href="https://frontterrain.com/support">Help Center</a>
...
L94: /**
L95: * Create custom Nodemailer transport using process.env SMTP or fallback
L96: */
...
L142: },
L143: body: JSON.stringify({
L144: sender: { name: 'Scout Welcome', email: senderEmail },
```

### 9. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** bin/src/commands/setup.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ft-scout@8.0.3/bin/src/commands/setup.js>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L4: import path from 'path';
L5: import { execSync } from 'child_process';
L6: import { safeNote } from '../utils/markdown.js';
...
L9: s.start('Diagnosing local runtime environment & dependencies...');
L10: const cwd = process.cwd();
L11: const passes = [];
...
L16: try {
L17: const checkCmd = process.platform === 'win32' ? `where ${cmd}` : `command -v ${cmd}`;
L18: execSync(checkCmd, { stdio: 'ignore', cwd });
...
L46: // Check 2: Node version check
L47: const pkgPath = path.join(cwd, 'package.json');
L48: if (fs.existsSync(pkgPath)) {
```

### 10. High: Remote Agent Bridge
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** bin/src/engine/agentEngine.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ft-scout@8.0.3/bin/src/engine/agentEngine.js>)

Source exposes local file and command tools to a remote model endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2: import path from 'path';
L3: import { exec } from 'child_process';
L4: import { promisify } from 'util';
...
L475: }
L476: fs.writeFileSync(scratchpadPath, mdContent, 'utf-8');
L477: }
...
L857: response = await callOpenAIWithRetry(async (model) => {
L858: return await openai.chat.completions.create({
L859: model,
...
L879: \`\`\`
L880: Available tools: read_file, write_file, edit_file, run_command, list_dir, grep_search, glob_search, tree_view, file_info, multi_edit_file, fetch_url, git_diff, open_app, app_action...
L881: For app takeover/control use: { "tool": "app_action", "args": { "app": "browser", "action": "takeover" } }
```

### 11. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** bin/src/utils/email.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ft-scout@8.0.3/bin/src/utils/email.js>)

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> bin/ft.js -> bin/src/index.js -> bin/src/commands/signup.js -> bin/src/utils/email.js
L5: import { FIREBASE_API_KEY, FIREBASE_TENANT_ID } from './firebaseAuth.js';
L6: const cwdEnv = path.resolve(process.cwd(), '.env');
L7: if (fs.existsSync(cwdEnv)) {
...
L80: </ul>
L81: <p>For more commands refer <a href="https://frontterrain.com/ft-scout">here</a></p><br>
L82: <p>Have any suggestion, feedback or need assistance we\'re always here on <a href="https://frontterrain.com/support">Help Center</a>
...
L94: /**
L95: * Create custom Nodemailer transport using process.env SMTP or fallback
L96: */
...
L142: },
L143: body: JSON.stringify({
L144: sender: { name: 'Scout Welcome', email: senderEmail },
```

### 12. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** bin/src/utils/email.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ft-scout@8.0.3/bin/src/utils/email.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> bin/ft.js -> bin/src/index.js -> bin/src/commands/signup.js -> bin/src/utils/email.js
L5: import { FIREBASE_API_KEY, FIREBASE_TENANT_ID } from './firebaseAuth.js';
L6: const cwdEnv = path.resolve(process.cwd(), '.env');
L7: if (fs.existsSync(cwdEnv)) {
...
L80: </ul>
L81: <p>For more commands refer <a href="https://frontterrain.com/ft-scout">here</a></p><br>
L82: <p>Have any suggestion, feedback or need assistance we\'re always here on <a href="https://frontterrain.com/support">Help Center</a>
...
L94: /**
L95: * Create custom Nodemailer transport using process.env SMTP or fallback
L96: */
...
L142: },
L143: body: JSON.stringify({
L144: sender: { name: 'Scout Welcome', email: senderEmail },
```

### 13. High: Runtime Package Install
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 86.0%
- **Path:** bin/src/server/server.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ft-scout@8.0.3/bin/src/server/server.js>)

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L154: else if (fs.existsSync(indexScript)) {
L155: execCmd = `npx tsx "${indexScript}" ${command}`;
L156: }
...
L159: }
L160: exec(execCmd, { cwd: process.cwd() }, (err, stdout, stderr) => {
L161: const output = (stdout || '') + (stderr || '');
```

### 14. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 15. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 16. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** bin/src/engine/scripts/winCapture.ps1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ft-scout@8.0.3/bin/src/engine/scripts/winCapture.ps1>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = [redacted].ps1
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 8269
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 17. Medium: Ships Compressed Blob
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** front-terrain-cli-1.0.0.tgz
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ft-scout@8.0.3/front-terrain-cli-1.0.0.tgz>)

Package ships compressed or archive-like blobs.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = front-terrain-cli-1.0.0.tgz
kind = compressed_blob
sizeBytes = 8643
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 18. High: Ships High Entropy Blob
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** front-terrain-cli-1.0.0.tgz
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ft-scout@8.0.3/front-terrain-cli-1.0.0.tgz>)

Package ships high-entropy non-source blobs.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = front-terrain-cli-1.0.0.tgz
kind = high_entropy_blob
sizeBytes = 8643
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 19. Low: Nested Archive Needs Inspection
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 80.0%
- **Path:** front-terrain-cli-1.0.0.tgz
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ft-scout@8.0.3/front-terrain-cli-1.0.0.tgz>)

Package ships a nested archive or MCP bundle that was inventoried but not recursively analyzed.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = front-terrain-cli-1.0.0.tgz
kind = nested_archive_needs_inspection
sizeBytes = 8643
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 20. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 21. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** bin/src/engine/web.js\#virtual:normalized:round1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ft-scout@8.0.3/bin/src/engine/web.js%23virtual%3Anormalized%3Around1>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1
```

### 22. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** bin/src/engine/agentEngine.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ft-scout@8.0.3/bin/src/engine/agentEngine.js>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = ft-scout@9.0.4
matchedIdentity = npm:ZnQtc2NvdXQ:9.0.4
similarity = 0.689
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

### 23. High: Secret Pattern
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** bin/src/utils/firebaseAuth.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ft-scout@8.0.3/bin/src/utils/firebaseAuth.js>)

Google API key in bin/src/utils/firebaseAuth.js

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 1
```

### 24. High: Secret Pattern
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** web/app.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ft-scout@8.0.3/web/app.js>)

Google API key in web/app.js

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 6
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 8
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 3
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 8

### Published dependency entries
- @clack/prompts ^1.7.0 (Dependency)
- @types/nodemailer ^8.0.2 (Dependency)
- chalk ^6.0.0 (Dependency)
- commander ^13.1.0 (Dependency)
- dotenv ^17.4.2 (Dependency)
- nodemailer ^9.0.4 (Dependency)
- openai ^7.1.0 (Dependency)
- simple-git ^3.36.0 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** ft-scout
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 8.0.3
- **License:** ISC
- **Version published:** 2026-09-10T06:22:37.802Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-08-05T17:09:29.608Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-04T03:25:21.097Z
- **Known versions:** 54
- **Latest version:** 9.5.2
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** FrontTerrain — The Onboarding Co-Pilot for New Codebases
- **Author:** Front Terrain
- **Maintainers:** rishishandilya
- **Keywords:** cli, onboarding, git, llm, ai
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 143
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 2,556,632 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/ft-scout/v/8.0.3>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/Front-Terrain/FT-Check>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/Front-Terrain/FT-Check#readme>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/Front-Terrain/FT-Check/issues>)