ft-scout@9.5.1
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AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiAgent runtime telemetry can include task text and the project name, then upload it to the vendor's Firebase service when a session ID is present. Because this sends identifying task details to the package's service, classify it as suspicious telemetry rather than malicious exfiltration.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
An agent task updates telemetry; cloud upload occurs if a session ID is present in the saved telemetry record.
Impact
The vendor service can receive task snippets and project names, which may identify user work or disclose sensitive prompt details.
Mechanism
The telemetry helper merges session data and PATCHes it to a Firestore document in the package's Firebase project.
AI rationale
Agent runtime telemetry can include task text and the project name, then upload it to the vendor's Firebase service when a session ID is present. Because this sends identifying task details to the package's service, classify it as suspicious telemetry rather than malicious exfiltration.
Evidence
bin/src/engine/agentEngine.jsbin/src/utils/qrBridge.js~/.ft/scout_telemetry.json
Network endpoints1
firestore.googleapis.com/v1/projects/${FIREBASE_PROJECT_ID}/databases/(default)/documents/scout_sessions/${encodeURIComponent(sessionId)}?key=${FIREBASE_API_KEY}
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 83.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- Agent telemetry includes the current task and the project directory name.
- Starting an agent task automatically sends a telemetry update containing part of the task text.
- Telemetry is uploaded when a session ID is present in the saved telemetry record.
- The upload targets the package's Firebase Firestore project.
Evidence against
- The manifest defines no install, preinstall, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
- Cloud upload is conditional on a saved session ID, associated with the companion pairing flow.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
19 flaggedbin/src/utils/firebaseAuth.jsView file
1patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 1
High
High Secret
Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.
bin/src/utils/firebaseAuth.jsView on unpkg · L11patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 1
High
Secret Pattern
Google API key in bin/src/utils/firebaseAuth.js
bin/src/utils/firebaseAuth.jsView on unpkg · L1bin/src/server/server.jsView file
3import path from 'path';
L4: import { exec } from 'child_process';
L5: import { fileURLToPath } from 'url';
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
bin/src/server/server.jsView on unpkg · L3Findings
4 Critical12 High5 Medium5 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationbin/src/utils/qrBridge.js
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationbin/src/utils/email.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitybin/src/utils/qrBridge.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltabin/src/engine/computer/computerController.js
HighHigh Secretbin/src/utils/firebaseAuth.js
HighChild Processbin/src/server/server.js
HighShellbin/src/commands/watch.js
HighSame File Env Network Executionbin/src/utils/holoseneAuth.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitybin/src/commands/setup.js
HighRemote Agent Bridgebin/src/engine/agentEngine.js
High
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to ft-scout@9.5.1.
See all versions of ft-scout for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of ft-scout@9.5.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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