gehneb

package.json declares `"consolefy": "git+https://github.com/ccndjdjdnnddnd-jpg/sbdrsfhbrfh.git"` instead of resolving the legitimate `consolefy` package from the npm registry. The git URL has no commit SHA, tag, or branch pin, so `npm install` clones whatever HEAD points to at install time — fully mutable by the owner of that throwaway GitHub account (random-character username, unrelated to the legitimate consolefy publisher). The package's library entry (`lib/index.js`) transitively loads `lib/Classes/Client.js` and `lib/Classes/CommandHandler.js`, both of which `require("consolefy")` at module top level, so any code the attacker pushes to that repo executes on every installer that requires gehneb. Combined signals: empty `description` and empty `author` metadata, short opaque package name, and a Baileys/WhatsApp-bot dependency surface re-published under unrelated branding. The unpinned-attacker-repo override alone provides a silent install-time/require-time RCE channel into the installer's environment. ## Source: ghsa-malware (cd08d8ccd5bda23900ab6d6d8595e34593f9bfcf258a419c5eafe017ed7a61b2) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.