gitxelectron@1.2.2
An elegant, completely silent auto-syncing Git client. Works as a desktop app and npm CLI tool.
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe code establishes a concrete unvalidated remote-command execution risk, but the observed inference calls are also plausibly part of the advertised Git-assistant functionality. Static source inspection does not prove a package-controlled attacker endpoint or automatic credential theft.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Run the push command until it fails, or invoke the desktop AI error-recovery action after GitHub login.
Impact
A manipulated or compromised AI response could execute arbitrary commands in the user's working repository context; repository metadata and a GitHub token are sent to the inference service.
Mechanism
Unvalidated AI-generated shell-command execution and external token-backed inference requests.
AI rationale
The code establishes a concrete unvalidated remote-command execution risk, but the observed inference calls are also plausibly part of the advertised Git-assistant functionality. Static source inspection does not prove a package-controlled attacker endpoint or automatic credential theft.
Evidence
package.jsonbin/cli.jsout/main/index.js
Network endpoints2
models.inference.ai.azure.comrouter.huggingface.co/v1
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Critical Vulnerability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- Install hooks run package code automatically.
- The CLI executes every command returned by an external AI response without validation.
- The desktop handler forwards a stored GitHub token as an API key to an external inference endpoint along with repository context.
Evidence against
- The inference endpoint is labeled as a GitHub Copilot Models fallback, consistent with an AI Git-client feature.
- The dangerous command path requires a user-invoked push to fail; no automatic secret-harvesting loop was found.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
12 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgbin/postinstall.jsView file
2L3: const { spawn } = require('child_process')
L4: const path = require('path')
High
46
Findings
3 Critical8 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationout/main/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityout/main/index.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltaout/main/index.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighChild Processbin/postinstall.js
HighShellbin/postinstall.js
HighRuntime Package Installbin/postinstall.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritybin/cli.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityout/main/index.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritybin/postinstall.js
HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signaturebin/cli.js
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to gitxelectron@1.2.2.
See all versions of gitxelectron for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of gitxelectron@1.2.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.