registry / Remote code execution / gitxelectron / 1.2.7

gitxelectron@1.2.7

An elegant, completely silent auto-syncing Git client. Works as a desktop app and npm CLI tool.

AI Security Review

scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Source is a GitElectron client, not a hidden exfil dropper: GitHub OAuth, git, and AI calls go to GitHub, GitHub Models, Gemini, Hugging Face, and npm. It still ships a real dual-use risk because CLI auto-heal execSyncs model-returned commands and the updater installs differently named packages.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

npm install -g launches the app; gitxelectron push on error runs auto-heal; users can click Fix with AI or Install update.

Impact

A failed CLI push can run arbitrary local commands. A GitHub OAuth token is sent to GitHub Models. An update can replace the tool with other global packages.

Mechanism

Unvalidated LLM command execution plus GitHub token reuse and cross-package npm update

AI rationale

Evidence

bin/cli.jsout/main/index.jsbin/postinstall.jspackage.jsonbin/preuninstall.js

Network endpoints5

models.inference.ai.azure.comrouter.huggingface.co/v1github.com/login/device/codeapi.github.comregistry.npmjs.org/gitelectron/latest

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 84.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

On a failed gitxelectron push, the CLI asks an AI model for commands and runs each one with execSync with no allowlist or confirmation.
The desktop app reuses a stored GitHub OAuth token as an OpenAI API key against models.inference.ai.azure.com and can send git diffs, status, and conflicted file contents to that API and Gemini.
Global npm postinstall launches the Electron app for GitHub login and may create a Windows desktop shortcut.
The in-app updater runs npm i -g gitelectron@latest gitquickpush-cli@latest, which are different package names than gitxelectron.
preinstall and preuninstall force-kill processes named GitElectron via taskkill or pkill.

Evidence against

Reached hosts are GitHub, GitHub Models, Hugging Face, Gemini, and the npm registry; no unrelated drop server or webhook was found.
GitHub tokens are stored with Electron safeStorage and injected only into github.com remotes for git.
Desktop Fix with AI is a user button, and auto-sync starts from a localStorage flag rather than always-on install.
Lifecycle scripts launch or stop this app, not a foreign AI-agent config surface.

Source & flagged code

12 flagged

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

bin/postinstall.jsView file

2L3: const { spawn } = require('child_process') L4: const path = require('path')

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L2

46const { execSync } = require('child_process'); L47: execSync(`powershell -NoProfile -Command "${psCommand}"`, { stdio: 'ignore' }); L48: console.log('✅ Desktop shortcut created successfully!');

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

bin/postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L46

13const { execSync } = require('child_process') L14: execSync('npx electron-builder install-app-deps', { stdio: 'inherit' }) L15: } else {

High

Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

bin/postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L13

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = gitxelectron@1.2.1 matchedPath = bin/postinstall.js matchedIdentity = npm:Z2l0eGVsZWN0cm9u:1.2.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/postinstall.jsView on unpkg

out/main/index.jsView file

6const crypto = require("crypto"); L7: const child_process = require("child_process"); L8: const readline = require("readline"); ... L40: const decrypted = electron.safeStorage.decryptString(encrypted); L41: accounts = JSON.parse(decrypted); L42: } ... L119: async function startDeviceFlow(_sessionId) { L120: const response = await fetch("https://github.com/login/device/code", { L121: method: "POST", ... L125: }, L126: body: JSON.stringify({ L127: client_id: GITHUB_CLIENT_ID,

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

out/main/index.jsView on unpkg · L6

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

out/main/index.jsView on unpkg · L6

6Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> out/main/index.js L6: const crypto = require("crypto"); L7: const child_process = require("child_process"); L8: const readline = require("readline"); ... L40: const decrypted = electron.safeStorage.decryptString(encrypted); L41: accounts = JSON.parse(decrypted); L42: } ... L119: async function startDeviceFlow(_sessionId) { L120: const response = await fetch("https://github.com/login/device/code", { L121: method: "POST", ... L125: }, L126: body: JSON.stringify({ L127: client_id: GITHUB_CLIENT_ID,

bin/cli.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = gitxelectron@1.2.1 matchedPath = bin/cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:Z2l0eGVsZWN0cm9u:1.2.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/cli.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

12 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

bin/postinstall.jsView file

2L3: const { spawn } = require('child_process') L4: const path = require('path')

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L2

Findings

4 Critical7 High4 Medium5 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationout/main/index.js

CriticalDownload Executeout/main/index.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityout/main/index.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltaout/main/index.js

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighChild Processbin/postinstall.js

HighShellbin/postinstall.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistenceout/main/index.js

HighRuntime Package Installbin/postinstall.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritybin/cli.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritybin/postinstall.js

Medium

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to gitxelectron@1.2.7.

See all versions of gitxelectron for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of gitxelectron@1.2.7 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-18 16:41:33.987Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code