gitxelectron@1.3.1
An elegant, completely silent auto-syncing Git client. Works as a desktop app and npm CLI tool.
AI Security Review
scanned 27d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is a dangerous, insufficiently constrained command-execution capability rather than confirmed malware. The lifecycle behavior increases concern but does not establish a blocking install-time attack chain.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Run the push command and encounter a Git error; separately, install the package globally.
Impact
A compromised, manipulated, or erroneous AI response could run arbitrary local commands in the caller's working environment. No confirmed covert attack or data export was established.
Mechanism
The CLI obtains a commands array from an AI response and executes every element through a shell executor with no command validation. The postinstall hook starts Electron in detached mode for global installs.
AI rationale
This is a dangerous, insufficiently constrained command-execution capability rather than confirmed malware. The lifecycle behavior increases concern but does not establish a blocking install-time attack chain.
Evidence
bin/cli.jsbin/postinstall.jspackage.jsonout/main/index.js
Network endpoints1
router.huggingface.co/v1
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 93.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The package registers both preinstall and postinstall lifecycle hooks.
- The global postinstall path launches a detached Electron application without an explicit user command.
- The push error path accepts commands returned by an AI service and passes each one directly to a shell executor without an allowlist or confirmation.
- The desktop update handler queries a registry entry for a differently named package and prepares a shell-based global installation command.
Evidence against
- The command-execution path is reached through the user-invoked push command after a Git failure.
- No hidden credential export, unrelated network recipient, or self-dependency chain was identified in the inspected entrypoints.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
11 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgbin/postinstall.jsView file
2L3: const { spawn } = require('child_process')
L4: const path = require('path')
High
46
Findings
4 Critical6 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationout/main/index.js
CriticalDownload Executeout/main/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityout/main/index.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltaout/main/index.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighChild Processbin/postinstall.js
HighShellbin/postinstall.js
HighRuntime Package Installbin/postinstall.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritybin/cli.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritybin/postinstall.js
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
Medium
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to gitxelectron@1.3.1.
See all versions of gitxelectron for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of gitxelectron@1.3.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.