registry / Remote code execution / gitxelectron / 1.3.4

gitxelectron@1.3.4

An elegant, completely silent auto-syncing Git client. Works as a desktop app and npm CLI tool.

AI Security Review

scanned 25d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The package exposes remote AI-controlled shell execution in a user-invoked recovery path and performs intrusive lifecycle actions. Static inspection does not establish covert exfiltration or a block-level automatic attack.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Installing the package activates lifecycle hooks; running the push command and encountering an error activates AI recovery.

Impact

A compromised, manipulated, or unexpected AI response can execute commands with the CLI user's permissions. Install-time behavior creates additional unrequested process and command execution.

Mechanism

Remote AI output is parsed as command strings and passed to shell execution without a command allowlist. The installer invokes npx and may detach an Electron application process.

AI rationale

Evidence

bin/postinstall.jsbin/cli.js

Network endpoints1

router.huggingface.co/v1

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 94.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The package defines automatic preinstall and postinstall lifecycle hooks.
Its postinstall hook invokes npx and, for global installation, launches a detached Electron process.
The CLI sends an error-derived prompt to a third-party AI endpoint and expects command output.
The CLI executes every AI-returned command string through a shell without an allowlist or confirmation.

Evidence against

The graphical application routes suggested fixes through Git argument execution rather than a shell.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 6 file(s), 1.35 MB of source, external domains: api.github.com, dev.azure.com, github.com, models.inference.ai.azure.com, react.dev, registry.npmjs.org, router.huggingface.co, www.w3.org

Source & flagged code

10 flagged

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

bin/postinstall.jsView file

2L3: const { spawn } = require('child_process') L4: const path = require('path')

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L2

46const { execSync } = require('child_process'); L47: execSync(`powershell -NoProfile -Command "${psCommand}"`, { stdio: 'ignore' }); L48: console.log('✅ Desktop shortcut created successfully!');

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

bin/postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L46

13const { execSync } = require('child_process') L14: execSync('npx electron-builder install-app-deps', { stdio: 'inherit' }) L15: } else {

High

Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

bin/postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L13

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = gitxelectron@1.2.1 matchedPath = bin/postinstall.js matchedIdentity = npm:Z2l0eGVsZWN0cm9u:1.2.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/postinstall.jsView on unpkg

out/main/index.jsView file

6const crypto = require("crypto"); L7: const child_process = require("child_process"); L8: const generativeAi = require("@google/generative-ai"); ... L38: const decrypted = electron.safeStorage.decryptString(encrypted); L39: accounts = JSON.parse(decrypted); L40: } ... L117: async function startDeviceFlow(_sessionId) { L118: const response = await fetch("https://github.com/login/device/code", { L119: method: "POST", ... L123: }, L124: body: JSON.stringify({ L125: client_id: GITHUB_CLIENT_ID,

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

out/main/index.jsView on unpkg · L6

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

out/main/index.jsView on unpkg · L6

6Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> out/main/index.js L6: const crypto = require("crypto"); L7: const child_process = require("child_process"); L8: const generativeAi = require("@google/generative-ai"); ... L38: const decrypted = electron.safeStorage.decryptString(encrypted); L39: accounts = JSON.parse(decrypted); L40: } ... L117: async function startDeviceFlow(_sessionId) { L118: const response = await fetch("https://github.com/login/device/code", { L119: method: "POST", ... L123: }, L124: body: JSON.stringify({ L125: client_id: GITHUB_CLIENT_ID,

bin/cli.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = gitxelectron@1.2.1 matchedPath = bin/cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:Z2l0eGVsZWN0cm9u:1.2.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/cli.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

10 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

bin/postinstall.jsView file

2L3: const { spawn } = require('child_process') L4: const path = require('path')

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L2

Findings

3 Critical6 High4 Medium5 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationout/main/index.js

CriticalDownload Executeout/main/index.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityout/main/index.js

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighChild Processbin/postinstall.js

HighShellbin/postinstall.js

HighRuntime Package Installbin/postinstall.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritybin/cli.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritybin/postinstall.js

MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to gitxelectron@1.3.4.

See all versions of gitxelectron for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of gitxelectron@1.3.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-27 15:22:29.539Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.